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Abstract
This paper provides a model of the market for news where profit-maximizing media
outlets choose their editors from a population of rational citizens. The analysis identi-
fies a key novel mechanism of media bias: the bias in a media outlet’s news reports may
be the result of the slanted endogenous information acquisition strategy of its editor.
Accordingly, the results show that citizens find it optimal to acquire information from
a media outlet whose editor has similar ideological preferences. At the same time,
there is always an upper bound on the possible “extremism” of an editor above which
the citizens’ demand for news is strictly decreasing. Depending on the distribution
of citizens’ ideological preferences, a media outlet may choose an ideological editor
even in a monopolistic market. Moreover, ideological editors are more likely to be
present in the market for news: i) the higher the number of media outlets competing
in the market for news; ii) the lower the opportunity cost that citizens have to incur
to acquire information.
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1 Introduction
The importance of news media on the overall functioning of democracies is well documented
by the extensive empirical evidence showing the significant influence of media on political
outcomes.1 At the same time, journalists and communications scholars have provided sub-
stantial anecdotal evidence suggesting that the information supplied by news media to their
viewers is often far from being “fair and balanced” (e.g., Goldberg, 2002; Alterman, 2003;
Bagdikian, 2004; Davies, 2008). Significant deviations from the standard of unbiased news
seem to be present even in fairly competitive media markets as, for example, the US. Indeed,
a recent empirical literature in economics and political science has shown the presence of
a systematic bias in the market for news using a variety of instruments to measure such
bias (e.g., Groseclose and Milyo, 2005; Ho and Quinn, 2008; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010,
Larcinese et al., 2011; Puglisi, 2011).2 In parallel, a fast growing theoretical literature has
tried to rationalize the presence of such systematic bias in the media by focusing on vari-
ous incentives to bias the information supplied to media viewers.3 However, all theoretical
contributions that have so far attempted to explain the existence of bias in media reports
assume that the information available to media outlets is exogenously given. Hence, all the
existing theoretical literature considers, implicitly or explicitly, the same underlying mech-
anism of media bias: media outlets are assumed to bias their news reports by selectively
omitting a subset of their (exogenously given) information.
This paper provides several novel contributions to the understanding of the market for
news by identifying a key mechanism of media bias that has so far being neglected by the
literature. In particular, the paper analyzes the endogenous acquisition of information by
media editors and shows that the bias in media reports may arise from the way media editors
gather information in the first place, rather than from the selective omission of exogenously
given information. Specifically, the paper points out that the bias in a media outlet’s news
reports may be the result of the slanted optimal information acquisition strategy of its
editor. In turn, while rational citizens always want any media editor to never omit any
available information, they may still prefer a like-minded editor (i.e., an editor with similar
ideological preferences) to a moderate one. That is, a rational citizen may prefer to watch
the news reports supplied by a like-minded editor simply because the set of information
acquired by such an editor provide her with a higher expected utility with respect to the
one acquired by a moderate editor. Consequently, competitive profit-maximizing media
outlets may find optimal to choose ideological editors in order to capture the demand of
news coming from citizens with similar ideological preferences. Moreover, since the more
1See, among the others, Stro¨mberg, 2004a; Gentzkow, 2006; Eisensee and Stro¨mberg, 2007; Oberholzer-
Gee and Waldfogel, 2009; Snyder and Stro¨mberg, 2010.
2For evidence on the empirical effects of media bias see DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), Gerber et al.
(2009), DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010) and Enikolopov et al. (2011).
3See Prat and Stro¨mberg (2011) for an extensive survey of the literature on the political economy of
mass media.
1
competitive the market for news is, the more media outlets seek to differentiate their news
products, competition tends to increase the probably of media outlets choosing ideological
editors. In particular, this paper is the first to show the presence of a direct link between
competition and ideological diversity in a market for news where consumers are rational (i.e.,
they do not derive any exogenous utility from receiving biased information), they share the
same prior beliefs and media outlets are just profit-maximizers.4
The model analyses a market for news driven by the citizens’ demand for information.
Citizens have to choose between two alternative candidates (or policies). Citizens differ in
their idiosyncratic (i.e., ideological) preferences, but all equally value the valence (i.e., qual-
ity) of alternative candidates (or public benefit of alternative policies). Citizens may acquire
some information about the quality of different candidates by watching news reports. News
reports are produced by editors chosen by media outlets from the population of citizens.
That is, once chosen by a media outlet, a citizen-editor can gather (costly) information
about the candidates’ quality and then report it to the viewers.
The results show that editors with different idiosyncratic preferences have different optimal
information acquisition strategies. A moderate editor (i.e., one who is ex-ante indifferent
between the two candidates) uses a balanced information acquisition strategy. The amount
of evidence in support of the leftist candidate that she requires in order to stop collecting
information and produce a report in favor of such candidate is the same as the one she
requires to produce a report in favor of the rightist candidate. Instead, an ideological editor
(i.e., one who, ex-ante, always prefers either the leftist or the rightist candidate) acquires
information in a slanted way. A small amount of evidence in support of the leftist candidate
is sufficient to induce a leftist editor to stop investing in information acquisition and produce
a report in favor of that candidate. On the other hand, such an editor would produce a
report in favor of the rightist candidate only after having collected a large amount of evidence
in support of that candidate. Moreover, the results shed light on the relationship between
ideology and informativeness of news reports: the more extreme the idiosyncratic preferences
of an editor are, the lower the expected accuracy of her news reports (i.e., higher probability
of endorsing the low-valence candidate).
In order to access news reports, citizens have to pay an opportunity cost. When choosing
among different media outlets, rational citizens anticipate that the news reports coming
from media editors with different ideological preferences will be different simply because the
information acquired by each of these editors are different. Specifically, in choosing whether
or not to watch a media outlet report, and if so, which of them to watch, a citizen will take
into account two different components. She will consider how much information the editor of
a media outlet may have collected before producing a news report. At the same time, she will
also take into account how valuable the information gathered by an editor could be for her
4Competition and diversity represent two strategic policy goals of the Federal Communication Commis-
sion in the US (Source: http://www.fcc.gov/mediagoals)
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final choice. In turn, this implies that different citizens have different rationales for acquiring
information from a like-minded source. Specifically, the model points out the presence of
two rationales explaining why citizens find optimal to watch a media outlet whose editor has
similar idiosyncratic preferences. From the perspective of very liberal or very conservative
citizens, a like-minded source of information is the only source of information that could
be pivotal for their choice. Indeed, these citizens would never change their ex-ante ranking
of preferences over candidates upon observing a report coming from a moderate editor.
Only a report of a like-minded editor in favor of the ideologically-farther candidate would
contain enough evidence to convince these citizens to choose such a candidate. On the
other hand, when choosing between a media outlet with a moderate editor and one with an
ideologically closer editor, moderate-liberal and moderate-conservative citizens will trade-
off the expected accuracy and the value of information provided by these different types of
editors. Citizens know that a moderate editor is the one who, in expectation, will produce the
most accurate news report. However, an ideologically-closer editor has a lower probability
of endorsing the ideologically-farther candidate by mistake. Thus, moderate-liberal and
moderate-conservative citizens prefer to acquire information from a like minded editor since
they care more about not choosing a low-valence ideologically-farther candidate than not
choosing a low-valence ideologically-closer one. Therefore, the model shows that citizens
find it optimal to acquire information from a media outlet having an editor with similar
idiosyncratic preferences even though they do not have any exogenous preferences for like-
minded sources of information. At the same time, since the more extreme the idiosyncratic
preferences of an editor are, the lower the accuracy of its news reports, there is always an
upper bound on the possible “extremism” of an editor above which the demand for news of
citizens is strictly decreasing.
Media outlets anticipate this behavior by citizens and hence they choose their editors
taking into account the expected demand for news reports produced by editors with different
idiosyncratic preferences. That is, by choosing a more leftist, moderate or rightist editor,
media outlets implicitly choose their product location in the political space. When the
distribution of citizens is such that the number of leftist and rightist citizens is higher than
the number of moderate ones, a media outlet may choose an ideological editor even in
a monopolistic market. Hence, even though citizens do not derive any exogenous utility
from acquiring biased information and the media outlet is just maximizing profits, the
endogenous acquisition of costly information may induce the media outlet to choose an
editor whose optimal information acquisition strategy is slanted in favor of the alternative
ex-ante preferred by a subset of citizens. This is true even in the case where all citizens
share the same ex-post ranking of preferences over candidates.
It is also shown that, even in the case where citizens are uniformly distributed in the
policy space, there is a threshold in the number of media outlets present in the market for
news above which media outlets may find optimal to choose ideological editors. Moreover,
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the lower the opportunity cost of watching news, the more likely it is that media outlets
would choose ideological editors for a given number of media outlets present in the market
for news.
Overall, the results suggest that ideological editors are more likely to be present in the
market for news: i) the higher the number of media outlets competing in the market for
news; ii) the lower the opportunity cost that citizens have to incur to acquire information.
The first result is driven by the incentives of profit-maximizing media outlets to differen-
tiate their news products. As a consequence, markets for news characterized by a higher
degree of competition are likely to have a higher degree of polarization of news media. This
result is consistent with the different degrees of ideological polarization of news sources ob-
served in online and oﬄine media markets (e.g., online newspapers and blogs with respect
to traditional newspapers and TV). As argued by Sunstein (2007), the dramatic expansion
in online media outlets seems to have increased the degree of polarization in the market for
news. Indeed, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) show that the “most extreme Internet sites are
far more polarized than any source oﬄine” (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011, page 15).5
The second result is driven by the demand for news coming from “extremist” citizens.
When the opportunity cost of acquiring information is high, the expected benefit of watching
news reports for “extremist” citizens is lower than the cost. Hence, in this case, media
outlets are likely to choose moderate editors since the bulk of the demand for news comes
from moderate citizens. Instead, when the opportunity cost is low, even “extremist” citizens
may find convenient to watch news reports when such news reports come from an editor with
similar idiosyncratic preferences. Hence, a media outlet may find it optimal to choose an
ideological editor to capture this demand for news by ideological citizens. A clear application
of such a result is represented by the market for news in the broadcast media sector with
respect to the press. The opportunity cost of watching a broadcast media report is arguably
lower than the one of reading a newspaper. The analysis thus suggests that, all other things
equal, the share of moderate editors present in the press sector should be higher than the
one of the broadcast media sector. At the same time, “extremist” citizens should be more
likely to acquire information from broadcast media than from newspapers and broadcast
media should face a higher overall demand with respect to the one faced by the press.
1.1 Related Literature
The literature has identified, so far, two different forces creating a bias in media reports.
The first one is a supply-driven bias: media bias may arise from the idiosyncratic preferences
of journalists (Baron, 2006), owners (Djankov et al., 2003; Anderson and McLaren, 2010),
governments (Besley and Prat, 2006), lobbies (Petrova, 2011; Sobbrio, 2011) or advertisers
5While both Sunstein (2007) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) point out the higher degree of polariza-
tion of online media sources with respect to the oﬄine ones, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) show that the
polarization of online media viewers may not necessarily be significatively higher than the one of viewers in
oﬄine media markets.
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(Ellman and Germano, 2009; Germano and Meier, 2010; Blasco et al., 2011).6 The second
one is a demand-driven bias. Part of this literature assumes that consumers like to receive
information confirming their bias and thus media just reflect and confirm the bias of their
audience (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005). On the other hand, Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2006) show that even when consumers do not like biased information, if media outlets have
reputation concerns and there is uncertainty on the quality of media outlets, in presence of
heterogeneous prior beliefs different media outlets may find it optimal to slant their reports
according to the prior beliefs of different segments of consumers. Finally, Chan and Suen
(2008) show that media slant emerges when media outlets observe the state of the world
but are exogenously constrained to report coarse information.7
The present paper contributes to this literature along four main dimensions. First, the
model identifies a novel mechanism of bias in media reports (i.e., the slanted endogenous
information acquisition of media editors) which is alternative and complementary to the
one considered, so far, by the literature (i.e., the selective omission of exogenously given
information).8 Second, the model provides a demand-driven rationale for the presence of
different ideological biases in the market for news, without relying on any exogenous prefer-
ences for biased news confirming individuals’ beliefs (as in Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005)
and without assuming heterogeneous prior beliefs (as in Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006). In
my model, the individual’s willingness to acquire information from a like-minded source is
the result of the endogenous acquisition of costly information by citizen-editors. Third, in
Chan and Suen (2008), competition does not lead to product differentiation. Instead, my
results point out that competing media outlets may find optimal to choose editors with dif-
ferent ideological preferences. Hence, I show that competition may increase the ideological
polarization of news media. Moreover, while in Chan and Suen (2008) any media outlet is
implicitly assumed to exogenously commit to a signal-threshold above which it endorses a
candidate, in my model an editor has a (credible) endogenous commitment to her optimal
information acquisition strategy. That is, as in the literature on citizen-candidates voters
know that a candidate can only credibly commit to her preferred policy (Osborne and Slivin-
sky, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997), in the present paper viewers know that a media outlet’s
editor can only credibly commit to her optimal stopping thresholds.9
Finally, as pointed out by Prat and Stro¨mberg (2011), the relationship between the ide-
6See also Duggan and Martinelli (2010) for a model where ideological media strategically select which
issues to cover.
7Chan and Suen (2008) also endogenize the platform of political parties in their model and provide several
interesting insights on the role of media on partisan policies.
8Section 6.5 describes a setting where both mechanism of media bias are present.
9In addition, differently from Chan and Suen (2008) where viewers can only learn coarse information
from a media outlet (i.e., they are just able to infer in which interval lies the signal observed by the media
outlet), in the present framework viewers always learn the underlying (difference of) signals collected by an
editor. Specifically, from the viewers’ perspective, it is equivalent whether the editor produces a coarse news
report on one of the candidates (e.g., endorsement) or she produces a news report showing all the signals
(e.g., evidence) collected. Indeed, upon observing a coarse news report, viewers are able to infer which
stopping threshold has been reached by the editor since they know the editor’s idiosyncratic preferences.
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ological positions of media outlets and the informativeness of their news reports is still
theoretically unclear. By micro-founding the endogenous information acquisition process of
citizen-editors, the model is able to provide novel insights on this issue. Specifically, the re-
sults show that the expected accuracy of news reports (i.e., expected probability of an editor
endorsing the high-valence candidate) is decreasing moving away from moderate editors. In
turn, this implies that there is always an upper bound on the possible “extremism” of an
editor above which the demand for news by citizens is strictly decreasing.
The results are consistent with the empirical results of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010). Us-
ing zip-code level data on newspaper circulation in the US, they show that the demand for
right-wing newspaper is higher in markets with a higher proportion of Republicans. More-
over, they find that ownership has little or no role in media slant.10 Similarly, Puglisi and
Snyder (2011) find that, on average, the ideological location of US newspapers corresponds
to the one of the median voter in their states. The present paper suggests that such findings
may not be the result of behavioral preferences for biased news but they may rather be
the result of the demand for costly information by rational individuals and the consequent
optimal ideological location of news by profit maximizing media outlets.11 The theoretical
framework of the paper is also closely related to the empirical analysis of newspaper en-
dorsements and media influence in the US by Chiang and Knight (2011). In line with the
predictions of my model, Chiang and Knight find that the degree of influence of a newspaper
on voters depends on the credibility of the endorsement.12
Formally, the structure of information acquisition by citizen-editors is related to the model
of Brocas and Carrillo (2009) on systematic errors in decision-making. In their setting for any
exogenous amount of information, all individuals choose the same action while in presence
of endogenous information acquisition different individuals have different probabilities of
choosing a given action. Specifically, they show that individuals favor actions with large
payoff-variance. My setting differs because it is assumed that all actions have the same
variance in payoffs for any citizen-editor and such variance is equal across citizen-editors.
Moreover, in my model citizen-editors differ in their ex-ante ranking of actions even when
they share the same ex-post ordinal preferences over actions.13
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the structure of
the game. Section 3 derives the optimal information acquisition strategy by citizen-editors.
Section 4 discusses the demand for news. Section 5 contains the results on the optimal choice
10More specifically, they find that “the slant of co-owned papers is only weakly (and statistically insignif-
icantly) correlated to a newspaper’s political alignment” (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010, page 38).
11Calvert (1985) was the first to point out the positive value of a biased source of information for a rational
decision-maker. See also Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) and Li and Suen (2004).
12Specifically, “endorsements for the Democratic candidate from left-leaning newspapers are less influential
than are endorsements from neutral or right-leaning newspapers and likewise for endorsements for the
Republican candidate” (Chiang and Knight, 2011, page 817).
13Notice also that in their model the cost of acquiring information is embedded in the discount factor.
Their results do not apply in presence of a per unit cost of sampling since individuals differ only in the
variance of their payoffs but not in their ex-ante ranking between actions.
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of editors by media outlets. Section 6 provides a discussion on the scope, implications and
the robustness of the results. Section 7 concludes. All the proofs are provided in the
appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Citizens
There are two alternative candidates/policies L and R where L = 0 and R = 1, i.e., the
policy space is Ψ = {0; 1}. A continuum of citizens of measure one have to decide which
candidate P ∈ {L;R} to choose. There are two possible states of the world s ∈ {l, r} . To
preserve symmetry, the common prior belief that the state of the world is r is assumed to
be Pr(s = r) = 1/2. Citizens care about the ideological distance between their idiosyncratic
preferences and the candidates’ policy platforms. Hence, citizens want to minimize the
euclidean distance between their policy preferences and the ones of the chosen candidate.
At the same time, citizens also care about the valence (i.e., quality) of the candidates.
The valence component is captured by an additive constant in the citizen’s utility function.
That is, regardless of her idiosyncratic policy preferences, each citizen gets an extra positive
payoff when she chooses the high-valence candidate and a negative one when the low-valence
candidate is chosen.14 Hence, citizen i’s utility function is:
ui(P, xi) = δIsIp − |P − xi| (1)
where xi represents the idiosyncratic (i.e., ideological) policy preference of citizen i and δ
represents the valence parameter. Moreover, without loss of generality δ ∈ (0, 1
2
] and:
Is =
{
1 if s = l
−1 if s = r and Ip =
{
1 if P = L
−1 if P = R (2)
As a consequence, candidate L gives a higher utility to citizens when the state of the world is
l than when the state is r (viceversa for candidate R).15 In other words, L and R represent
the alternative political platforms of the two candidates and 2δ represents the difference in
the valence of the two candidates in each state of the world.16 The idiosyncratic preferences
of citizens are distributed with a common knowledge c.d.f. F (x) with density function f(x)
14As usual in the literature on the demand for news (e.g., Stro¨mberg, 2004b; Mullainathan and Shleifer,
2005; Baron, 2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006; Chan and Suen, 2008; Anderson and McLaren, 2010) it is
assumed that citizens receive utility from choosing a given candidate/alternative per se. Section 6.2 provides
a discussion on this assumption.
15For a similar specification of the voters’ utility function see, for example, Aragones and Palfrey (2002).
16As an alternative interpretation of the model, L and R can be seen as two alternative policies (e.g.
implementing Kyoto’s protocol or not). Hence, if the state of the world is l then the public benefits/cost
ratio of policy L is higher than the one of R (viceversa if s = r). That is, if the state of the world is l policy
L is the most efficient one.
7
where supp [f(x)] = [0, 1]. To avoid the presence of exogenous asymmetries, the analysis
focuses on distributions that are symmetric and monotone in the sub-intervals x ∈ [0, 1
2
] and
x ∈ [1
2
, 1].17 The state contingent utilities of citizen i are, thus, as follows:
ui(L|s) =
{
δ − xi if s = l
−δ − xi if s = r
and ui(R|s) =
{
−δ + xi − 1 if s = l
δ + xi − 1 if s = r
(3)
Notice also that for any citizen i the two candidates have the same variance in payoffs and
such variance is equal across citizens since:
ui(L|s = l)− ui(L|s = r) = ui(R|s = r)− ui(R|s = l) = 2δ ∀i
Let Σ = {σl, σr} be the signal space. The signal likelihood function is as follows:
Pr(σl|s = l) = Pr(σr|s = r) = θ (4)
where θ ∈ (1
2
, 1
)
represents the precision of the signal. Suppose now that citizens receive nl
signals σl and nr signals σr on the state of the world. Then the citizens’ posterior beliefs
are:
Pr(s = r|nl, nr) = θ
nr−nl
θnr−nl + (1− θ)nr−nl
Therefore, denoting n = nr − nl, the citizens’ posterior beliefs can be denoted as follows:
µ(n) =
1
1 +
(
1−θ
θ
)n (5)
Hence, citizen i prefers candidate R to candidate L whenever:
µ(n) >
1
4δ
(2δ − 2xi + 1) = µ(nˆi) = µˆi (6)
That is nˆi is the difference in the number of signals in favor of state r which makes citizen
i being indifferent between candidates R and L. Notice that for δ = 1
2
, then µˆi ≥ 0,∀i.
Hence, for δ = 1
2
all citizens would prefer candidate L when s = l and candidate R when
s = r. That is, when δ = 1
2
, ex-post all citizens have the same ranking of preferences over
candidates. Instead, for 0 < δ < 1
2
there will be some “stubborn” citizens who will always
vote for the same candidate regardless of the state of the world. Moreover:
∂ui(R|µ(n))
∂µ(n)
= −∂ui(L|µ(n))
∂µ(n)
= 2δ, ∀i
hence, the utility functions of citizens i and j are always parallel. For any exogenously
given µ(n) ∈ (0, 1), different citizens may have different ranking of preferences regarding
17For example, the families of Uniform, Normal, and Cauchy distribution functions satisfy such property.
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candidates L and R. Specifically:
µˆ 1
2
=
1
2
and
∂µˆi
∂xi
< 0 (7)
Thus, citizens with more “rightist” preferences require less evidence in favor of R in order
to choose that candidate with respect to moderate citizens. Moreover, when a citizen cares
more about the true state of the world (i.e., when the valence component is larger), her
indifference threshold is closer to the one of a moderate citizen:
∂µˆi
∂δ
=
(2xi − 1)
4δ2
{
< 0 if xi <
1
2
> 0 if xi >
1
2
(8)
Hence, the more citizens care about the quality of different candidates, the less evidence in
favor of the ideologically-farther candidate they require in order to vote for her. The utilities
of citizens can then be represented as a function of their idiosyncratic preferences xi and
their posterior beliefs: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ix  
)0( =nuRxi  )0( =nuLxi  
 1 
 )1( =nuRxi  
)1( =nuLxi  
 -1/2 
Fig. 1. Expected Utility of citizens for n = 0 and n = 1
where uLxi(u
R
xi
) represents the expected utility of citizen i when choosing candidate L (R).
Clearly, the expected utility of choosing the leftist (rightist) candidate is lower (higher) the
more rightist a citizen is. The thick line represents the expected utility of citizens given their
prior beliefs (i.e., for µ(n = 0) = 1/2). The thin line instead represents the expected utility
of citizens when they have observed an extra signal in favor of R (i.e., for µ(n = 1) > 1/2).
Any extra signal in favor of R shifts upward the expected utility of choosing R while it
shifts downward the expected utility from choosing L. Viceversa, as shown by the following
graph, any extra signal in favor if L shifts upward the expected utility of choosing L while
it leads to a downward shift in the expected utility of choosing R.
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Fig. 2. Expected Utility of citizens for n = 0 and n = −1
For clarity of exposition, in what follows I will refer to citizens and editors with idiosyn-
cratic preferences xi = 1/2 as moderate citizens/editors. Hence, a citizen/editor is
labeled as moderate if she only cares about the valence of the candidates (i.e., ex-ante she
is indifferent between the two candidates). Instead, I will refer to citizens and editors with
idiosyncratic preferences xe 6= 1/2 as ideological citizens/editors. Hence, a citizen/editor
is labeled as ideological if, ex-ante, she always prefers one of the two candidates. Finally, a
citizen/editor i is labeled as more ideological than j if her idiosyncratic preferences are
closer to either 0 or 1 with respect to the idiosyncratic preferences of j.
2.2 The Game
There is a media industry composed by K ≥ 1 media outlets. Each media outlet is assumed
to be maximizing its viewership in order to maximize its advertising revenues. In order to
produce news reports, each media outlet has to choose an editor from the population of
citizens. Once chosen, a citizen-editor is endowed with a (costly) technology that allows her
to collect evidence on the state of the world. Specifically, an editor has to incur a cost c any
time she decides to draw a signal on the state of the world (e.g., effort she has to exert to
acquire information, opportunity cost of sending reporters to investigate an issue, etc.).18
The citizen-editor will then produce a news report based on the evidence collected. Citizens
will then decide whether to access a media outlet’s report by paying an opportunity cost
C or not. If they decide to watch a media outlet’s report they update their beliefs using
Bayes’ rule. Hence, the demand for news reports that a media outlet faces is a function of
the type of editor that it has chosen. That is, given an editor with idiosyncratic preferences
xe, the profit function of media outlet k is Πk(xe) = Dk(xe), where Dk(xe) is the demand
18By “editor” I refer to what is usually called “Editor-in-Chief” for a newspaper and “Managing Editor”
in the broadcast media sector. More in general, the model applies to the choice of a profit maximizing media
outlet regarding the type of journalists to be hired.
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for the news report produced by the media outlet.19 To summarize, the timing of the game
is as follows:
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Citizens decide whether  
to watch a media outlet’s 
report and if so, update 
their beliefs.  
Media outlets choose 
their editors from the 
population of citizens 
Nature draws 
state of the 
world l or r 
Each editor samples 
and then produces a 
news report 
Citizens choose their 
preferred candidate. 
Payoffs are realized 
Citizens decide whether  
to watch a media outlet’s 
report and if so, update 
their beliefs.  
Media outlets choose 
their editors from the 
population of citizens 
Nature draws 
state of the 
world l or r 
Each editor samples 
and then produces a 
news report 
Citizens choose their 
preferred candidate. 
Payoffs are realized 
Each voter decides 
which media to 
buy/watch 
Voters update their 
beliefs on candidates’ 
valence and vote. 
Payoffs are 
realized 
Media A and B 
choose their bias 
(and prices) 
Candidates L 
and R valences 
are drawn 
Fig. 3. Timing of the Game
Next section provides the analysis of the optimal strategy of a citizen-editor (i.e., her
optimal sampling strategy). Then, I characterize the demand for news reports by citizens
(i.e., Dk(xe)) as a function of an editor’s optimal sampling strategy. Finally, I analyze the
profit-maximizing strategy of media outlets within different structures of the market for news
(i.e., which type of editor maximizes the profits of media outlets in a monopoly, duopoly
and in presence of an arbitrary number of media outlets) and then discuss the results.
3 Optimal Information Acquisition by Citizen-Editors
Suppose that a media outlet has chosen a citizen with idiosyncratic preferences xe to work
as its editor (i.e., xe denotes the idiosyncratic preferences of a citizen-editor). Let τe,m(n)
be the decision of such a citizen-editor given that she has already drawn m = {0, 1, .....∞}
signals and given a current difference of signals in favor of r equal to n. Given any m and n,
the choice set of citizen-editor e is Γm(n) = {L,R, d}. Thus she can choose candidate L or R
or she can pay c and draw another signal on the state of the world (i.e., choose τe,m(n) = d,
where d stands for “draw”).
An editor faces a trade-off between the cost of acquiring a signal and the utility she gets
from the informative content of each signal.20 Thus, her problem is to find an optimal
stopping rule. Specifically, the value function that editor e maximizes after m draws, given
a current difference of signals in favor of state r equal to n, is the following:
Ve(n) =

max
{
δ(1− 2µ(n))− xe;
ν(n)Ve(n+ 1) + (1− ν(n))Ve(n− 1)− c
}
if µ(n) < µˆe
max
{
δ(2µ(n)− 1)− (1− xe);
ν(n)Ve(n+ 1) + (1− ν(n))Ve(n− 1)− c
}
if µ(n) ≥ µˆe
(9)
where ν(n) = µ(n)θ + (1 − µ(n))(1 − θ). In other words, if after m draws editor e has a
posterior µ(n) < µˆe she will decide either to stop acquiring signals and choose candidate
19See section 6.3 for a discussion on the structure of media outlets’ profits.
20Section 6.3 provides a discussion on the robustness of the optimal infomation acquisition strategy by
citizen-editors to the presence of incentive mechanisms.
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L with an expected payoff of (1 − µ(n)) (δ − xe) + µ(n)(−δ − xe) or paying c and getting
another signal. In this case, with probability ν the editor will get signal σr in which case the
value function becomes Ve(n+ 1) and with probability (1− ν) she will get signal σl in which
case the value function becomes Ve(n− 1). Instead, if after m draws editor e has a posterior
µ(n) ≥ µˆe she will decide either to stop acquiring information and choose candidate R with
an expected payoff of (1 − µ(n)) (xe − δ − 1) + µ(n)(xe + δ − 1) or paying c and getting
another signal. In this case, with probability ν the editor will get signal σr in which case
the value function becomes Ve(n + 1) and with probability (1 − ν) she will get signal σl in
which case the value function becomes Ve(n− 1).21
The following proposition characterizes the properties of the optimal information acqui-
sition strategy by an editor.
Proposition 1 For all c > 0, there exist (n∗e, n¯
∗
e) such that for ∀m,∀xe:
1. τe,m(n) = L if n ≤ n∗e, τe,m(n) = R if n ≥ n¯∗e and τe,m(n) = d if n ∈ (n∗e, n¯∗e).
2.
dn∗e
dxe
< 0,
dn∗e
dδ
< 0 and
dn∗e
dc
> 0
3. dn¯
∗
e
dxe
< 0, dn¯
∗
e
dδ
> 0 and dn¯
∗
e
dc
< 0
Moreover
∣∣∣∣dn¯∗edxe
∣∣∣∣

<
∣∣∣dn∗edxe ∣∣∣ for xe < 12
=
∣∣∣dn∗edxe ∣∣∣ for xe = 12
>
∣∣∣dn∗edxe ∣∣∣ for xe > 12
and
∣∣∣∣dn¯∗edδ
∣∣∣∣

<
∣∣∣dn∗edδ ∣∣∣ for xe < 12
=
∣∣∣dn∗edδ ∣∣∣ for xe = 12
>
∣∣∣dn∗edδ ∣∣∣ for xe > 12
The following graph illustrates the optimal strategy of editor e after m draws, given a
current difference of signals in favor of r equal to n:
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Fig. 4. Optimal Strategy of editor e
In other words, n∗e is the threshold below which editor e does not sample anymore and
reports |n∗e| more signals in favor of candidate L. Similarly, n¯∗e is the threshold above which
editor e does not sample anymore and reports n¯∗e more signals in favor of candidate R.
21Notice that the value functio of editor e does not depend on how many draws she has already done
(i.e., m), since the only relevant variable for her decision is the current difference of signals in favor of r
(i.e., the state variable is n).
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For any given n a more “rightist” editor is always more likely to produce a report in favor
of candidate R than in favor of L, with respect to a more “leftist” editor. That is, xe′ > xe
implies that n∗e′ < n
∗
e and n¯
∗
e′ < n¯
∗
e. Moreover, given editors e and e
′ with xe′ < xe ≤ 12 , then
n¯∗e′ − n∗e′ < n¯∗e − n∗e. Hence, a more leftist editor requires even less signal in favor of L than
more in favor of R to stop sampling, with respect to a more moderate editor. Similarly,
given editors e and e′ with xe′ > xe ≥ 12 , then n¯∗e′ − n∗e′ < n¯∗e − n∗e. Hence, a more rightist
editor requires even less signals in favor of R than more in favor of L with respect to a more
moderate editor. Therefore, the more moderate an editor is, the larger is her “information
acquisition set” Ne = {n|τe,m(n) = d} (i.e., the set of the difference in the number of signals
in favor of r (or in favor of l) such that editor e will keep sampling).22 At the same time,
an increase in the importance of the valence component of the editor’s utility function (δ)
makes an editor sample more in both directions (i.e., Ne becomes larger). Moreover, an
increase in δ induces a leftist editor to increase her “leftist” stopping rule more than her
“rightist” stopping rule (i.e., |n∗e| increases more than n¯∗e). The opposite is true for a rightist
editor. A higher δ is associated with more sampling in both directions and more symmetric
stopping rules for all types of editors. Therefore, Proposition 1 suggests that when δ is
higher any type of editor: i) acquires more information; ii) behaves as if she were more
moderate (i.e., has more symmetric stopping rules).
Notice that, for xe =
1
2
, n¯∗e − nˆe = nˆe − n∗e and thus µ(n¯∗e) = 1 − µ(n∗e). Moreover for
xe′ > xe:
µ(n∗e′) < µ(n
∗
e) < 1/2 < µ(n¯
∗
e′) < µ(n¯
∗
e) (10)
Moreover, given the comparative statics results of Proposition 1, it is possible to derive
some comparative statics results on the probability of an editor choosing the low-valence
candidate.
Corollary 1 The expected probability of an editor choosing the high-valence candidate P is
decreasing in the cost c of gathering information and increasing in the valence parameter
δ and in her ideological distance to the candidate’s platform |xe − P | . Moreover, the less
ideological an editor is, the higher this probability.
As expected, when the cost of sampling is higher, editors will make more “errors” in the
sense that they would be less likely to choose the high-valence candidate. Instead, when
editors care more about the quality of candidates their probability of choosing the low-
valence candidate decreases (since as shown by Proposition 1, when δ is higher editors acquire
more information). Moreover, this probability is decreasing in the “ideological distance”
between an editor and the candidate, e.g., more “rightist” editors are less likely to choose
candidate L when the high quality one is R and are instead more likely to choose candidate
R when the high quality one is L. More generally, from an ex-ante perspective, moderate
22Notice that it is always the case that either Ne ≡ ∅ or Ne ≡ {n∗e, n∗e + 1, ......, n¯∗e − 1, n¯∗e} ⊇ {0} .
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editors are less likely to make a report in favor of the low quality candidate. This is due to
the fact that, as shown by Proposition 1, the more moderate an editor is, the more symmetric
her sampling strategy is and also the more information she acquires before making a decision.
Therefore, by taking on average a “more informed” decision, moderate editors are less likely
to choose the low quality candidate. Hence, the less moderate an editor is, the lower the
expected accuracy of her news reports (i.e., lower probability of endorsing the high-valence
candidate)
At this point, it is important to remark that I am not implying in any way that moderate
editors have any higher intrinsic value per se with respect to ideological editors. Moderate
editors simply provide a useful benchmark since their perfectly symmetric stopping thresh-
olds correspond to what is usually considered as a “fair and balanced” news report.23 Indeed,
a moderate editor requires the exact same amount of evidence in favor of either candidate to
stop acquiring information and choose that candidate. Hence, moderate editors are used as
the benchmark for the discussion throughout the paper simply because the idea of “fair and
balanced” news reports may implicitly suggests that rational citizens should always demand
this type of news (i.e., there should not be any media slant). Nevertheless, as indeed shown
in the next section, these “fair and balanced” news reports are not necessarily the optimal
ones from the perspective of every single citizen.
4 The Demand for News
This section analyzes the demand by citizens for the news reports of a media outlet as a
function of the optimal stopping rules of its editor. Given the idiosyncratic preferences of a
media outlet’s editor, each citizen i can infer the set of possible reports of a media outlet (i.e.,
citizen i knows that the editor will either stop acquiring information after having collected
n∗e signals in favor of L or n¯
∗
e in favor of R). Hence, analogously to the literature on citizen-
candidates where citizens know that a candidate has a personal commitment to implement
a given policy, in the model citizens know that an editor has a personal commitment to
implement a given information acquisition strategy.24 From the citizens’ perspective, it
is equivalent whether the editor produces a coarse news report (e.g., endorsement) or she
produces a news report showing all the signals (e.g., evidence) collected. Indeed, upon
observing a coarse news report, citizens are able to infer which stopping threshold has been
reached by the editor since they know the editor’s idiosyncratic preferences. Moreover, this
stopping threshold contains all the information needed by citizens to update their beliefs
(i.e., the net difference of signals in favor of a candidate).
Let the citizens’ action space be A = {W,NW} where W stands for watching the news
23For example, the idea of “fair and balanced” news reports was at the foundation of the FCC Fairness
Doctrine in the US. Similarly, as stated by the BBC in the UK, “Impartiality lies at the heart of public service
and is the core of the BBC’s commitment to its audiences” (www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines)
24See sections 6.3 and 6.5 for a discussion on this issue.
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reports and NW for not watching the news reports. Then, the expected utility of citizen i
from not getting any news report from the media outlet is:
Ui(NW ) =
{
Ui
(
L|1
2
)
for xi <
1
2
Ui
(
R|1
2
)
for xi >
1
2
If instead citizen i decides to pay a cost C to access the news report of an editor with
idiosyncratic preferences xe, her expected utility will be:
Ui(W,xe) = Pr(n = n
∗
e) max {Ui (L|µ(n∗e)) ;Ui (R|µ(n∗e))}
+ Pr(n = n¯∗e) max {Ui (L|µ(n¯∗e)) ;Ui (R|µ(n¯∗e))} − C
(11)
Where the probabilities of reaching the two stopping threshold n∗e and n¯
∗
e are:
25
Pr(n = n∗e) =
2µ(n¯∗e)− 1
2 [µ(n¯∗e)− µ(n∗e)]
(12)
and
Pr(n = n¯∗e) =
1− 2µ(n∗e)
2 [µ(n¯∗e)− µ(n∗e)]
(13)
Let’s now focus on the marginal viewer. That is, the viewer who is indifferent between watch-
ing and not watching the media outlet’s reports. Specifically, there will be two marginal
viewers. One representing the most rightist citizen willing to watch news reports from a
media outlet having an editor with idiosyncratic preferences xe. The other one representing
the most leftist citizen willing to watch such news reports. Hence, there will be a xˆe = xˆe(xe)
and a x˜e = x˜e(xe) with xˆe < x˜e such that only citizens with xi ∈ [xˆe, x˜e] will watch the news
reports.26
Let’s start analyzing the marginal viewer for xi <
1
2
. Then Ui(NW ) = Ui
(
L|1
2
)
and since
by (10) n∗e < 0 < n¯
∗
e, it must be the case that:
Ui (L|µ(n∗e)) > Ui (R|µ(n∗e))
Moreover, the following individual rationality constraint must be satisfied for leftist citizens:
Ui (L|µ(n¯∗e)) < Ui (R|µ(n¯∗e)) (IRL)
otherwise, if Ui (L|µ(n¯∗e)) > Ui (R|µ(n¯∗e)) (i.e., if citizen i would always prefer alternative L
regardless of watching or not the news reports) then watching the news reports would never
be ex-post rational given the cost C. Thus the marginal leftist viewer will be the one having
25These are simply the probabilities of hitting the two stopping thresholds in a stochastic process with
two absorbing states (see Brocas and Carrillo, 2007). The online appendix provides a formal derivation of
these probabilities.
26Notice that it could also be the case that xˆe >
1
2 or x˜e <
1
2 but, clearly, not both.
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idiosyncratic preferences xˆe such that:
Ui
(
L
∣∣∣∣12
)
=
2µ(n¯∗e)− 1
2 [µ(n¯∗e)− µ(n∗e)]
Ui (L|µ(n∗e)) +
1− 2µ(n∗e)
2 [µ(n¯∗e)− µ(n∗e)]
Ui (R|µ(n¯∗e))− C
hence:
xˆe =
1
2
− δ(2µ(n¯∗e)− 1) +
C
2 Pr(n = n¯∗e)
(14)
Notice also that the ex-post rationality constraint (IRL) is satisfied as long as xi >
1
2
−
δ(2µ(n¯∗e) − 1) = xmin. Hence, since xˆe > xmin, such constraint is automatically satisfied for
any citizen willing to watch the news reports.
Let’s now focus on the marginal viewer for xi >
1
2
. Then Ui(NW ) = Ui
(
R|1
2
)
and since
by (10) n∗e < 0 < n¯
∗
e, it must be the case that:
Ui (R|µ(n¯∗e)) > Ui (L|µ(n¯∗e))
Moreover, the following individual rationality constraint must be satisfied for rightist citi-
zens:
Ui (L|µ(n∗e)) > Ui (R|µ(n∗e)) (IRR)
otherwise, if Ui (L|µ(n∗e)) < Ui (R|µ(n∗e)) (i.e., if citizen i would always prefer alternative
R regardless of watching or not the news reports) then watching the news reports would
not be ex-post rational given the cost C. Thus the marginal rightist viewer will be the one
having idiosyncratic preferences x˜e such that:
Ui
(
R
∣∣∣∣12
)
=
2µ(n¯∗e)− 1
2 [µ(n¯∗e)− µ(n∗e)]
Ui (L|µ(n∗e)) +
1− 2µ(n∗e)
2 [µ(n¯∗e)− µ(n∗e)]
Ui (R|µ(n¯∗e))− C
hence:
x˜e =
1
2
+ δ(1− 2µ(n∗e))−
C
2 Pr(n = n∗e)
(15)
Notice also that the ex-post rationality constraint (IRR) is satisfied as long as xi <
1
2
+δ(1−
2µ(n∗e)) = x
max. Hence, since x˜e < x
max, such constraint is automatically satisfied for any
citizen willing to watch the news reports. The following condition is assumed:
Assumption 1
C < Cmax = δ
(
1− λ n¯∗e |xe= 12
1 + λ
n¯∗e |xe= 12
)
where λ = 1−θ
θ
. It is easy to prove that when this assumption does not hold, there will
never be any leftist or rightist citizen willing to watch any news report. The following lemma
contains the main properties of the demand for news.
Lemma 1 Let (n¯∗e, n
∗
e) be the optimal stopping rules of an editor with idiosyncratic prefer-
ences xe.Then, (x˜e − xˆe) is decreasing in C and increasing in δ, n¯∗e and |n∗e| . Moreover, there
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is always an upper bound on the “extremism” of an editor above which (x˜e − xˆe) is strictly
decreasing. Specifically, x˜e is increasing in xe if and only if xe < x
max
eR
where xmaxeR ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
is such that:
C˜(n¯∗e(x
max
eR
), n∗e(x
max
eR
)) = C (16)
where dC˜(n¯∗e, n
∗
e)/dxe < 0 and C˜(n¯
∗
e, n
∗
e) ∈ (0, Cmax). Similarly, xˆe is increasing in xe if and
only if xe > x
min
eL
where xmineL ∈ (0, 12) is such that:
Cˆ(n¯∗e(x
min
eL
), n∗e(x
min
eL
)) = C (17)
where dCˆ(n¯∗e, n
∗
e)/dxe > 0 and Cˆ(n¯
∗
e, n
∗
e) ∈ (0, Cmax).
The above lemma summarizes the main features of the demand for news media by citizens.
Hence, it represents the main building-block for all the results that will be obtained in
the next section when discussing the optimal choice of editors by profit-maximizing media
outlets within a given market structure (i.e., monopoly, duopoly or an arbitrary number of
competing media outlets).
Obviously, a higher opportunity cost of watching news reports decreases the number of
leftist and rightist citizens willing to watch such reports. Instead, the higher the valence
component in the citizens utility function, the more leftist and rightist citizens will want
to watch news. Hence, the more citizens care about knowing the state of the world, the
more citizens will get informed. At the same time, all citizens care about receiving the
most accurate information, i.e., the lower is n∗e and the higher is n¯
∗
e, the more citizens
will want to get informed. Indeed, all citizens who value information (i.e., the ones whose
ex-post ranking of candidates is not always the same as their ex-ante one) would like to
watch a media outlet having an editor who samples in both directions until infinity, since
the more information she gets, the higher the citizens’ expected utility. However, given
the editor’s cost of acquiring information and the opportunity cost that each citizen faces
when accessing this information, when a citizen is choosing whether to watch a media outlet
and/or choosing among alternative news media outlets, she takes into account two different
components. Specifically, she considers how similar an editor’s idiosyncratic preferences are
to hers (i.e., how “valuable” the information provided by an editor could be to her) but she
also values the expected accuracy of information acquisition by an editor (i.e., how much
information an editor is acquiring and thus providing, on average).
Hence, the model points out the presence of two rationales explaining why citizens find
optimal to watch a media outlet whose editor has similar idiosyncratic preferences. For
citizens with preferences xi < xˆe|xe= 12 and xi > x˜e|xe= 12 only a media outlet with an editor
with similar idiosyncratic preferences can be pivotal for their choice (i.e., they never find
valuable the information coming from a moderate editor). Hence, either they will watch a
media outlet with an editor with (sufficiently) similar preferences or they will not watch any
media outlet at all.
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On the other hand, citizens with preferences xi ∈
[
xˆe|xe= 12 ,
1
2
)
∪
(
1
2
, x˜e|xe= 12
]
find the
information coming from a moderate editor valuable, but they may find the information
coming from an editor with similar idiosyncratic preferences even more valuable. That
is, these citizens face a basic trade-off between the “objective” difference in the expected
accuracy of news reports coming from different types of editors and their “subjective” value.
A citizen could make two specular errors. She may choose L when L is the low quality
candidate. Similarly, she may choose R when R is the low quality candidate. A moderate
citizen (i.e., xi =
1
2
) cares about these two errors equally. Hence, she always prefers to
watch a media outlet having a moderate editor since such an editor minimizes the overall
probability of making errors (see Corollary 1).27 On the other hand, for example, a liberal-
moderate citizen cares more about not making the error of choosing R when s = l. As shown
by Corollary 1, a liberal editor has a lower probability of making such error but a higher
probability of making a report in favor of L when s = r and a higher overall probability of
making errors. Hence, when choosing between a media outlet with a moderate editor and
one with an ideologically-closer editor, any citizen will trade-off the expected accuracy and
the value of information provided by these different types of editors.28 Therefore, rational
citizens may prefer a media outlet with a like-minded editor simply because they derive a
higher utility from the set of information acquired by such an editor with respect to the one
acquired by a moderate editor.
At the same time, as shown by the above lemma, the presence of a trade-off between
the expected accuracy and the value of information implies that there will always be an
upper bound on the “extremism” of an editor above which the demand for news by rational
citizens will be strictly decreasing. Thus, depending on the opportunity cost of acquiring
information, rational liberal (conservative) citizens may prefer a slightly more moderate-
liberal (conservative) editor to a less moderate one.
Therefore, since x˜e is always increasing in xe for xe ≤ 1/2 and xˆe is always increasing
in xe for xe ≥ 1/2, this rational framework is able to explain the presence of preferences
for like-minded sources of information. That is, the above lemma provides a rationale for
the presence of a demand for news coming from ideological editors. At the same time,
it also points out that rational citizens would never find optimal to demand news coming
from editors having very extreme ideological preferences since the expected accuracy of such
editors is very low. Hence, behavioral models (as the one of Mullainathan and Shleifer,
2005) remain probably better suited to explain the presence of a demand for news coming
from extremist editors.
The following section analyzes the implications of such demand for news for the optimal
27Therefore, as a side result, the model also provides a rationale for why citizens with non-ideological
preferences over candidates (i.e., moderate citizens) also prefer to watch news coming from a like-minded
editor (i.e., a moderate editor).
28Durante and Knight (2010) analyze the demand for news in Italy. They show that, indeed, when the
ideological position of a media outlet changes, viewers change their choice of news programs accordingly.
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choice of editors by profit maximizing media outlets.
5 Optimal Choice of Editors by Media
5.1 Monopoly
This section analyzes the implications of the citizen-editors model in a monopolistic market.
The media outlet’s owner wants to choose xe to maximize viewership. Choosing an editor
from the population of citizens is analogous to choosing a “product” location on the [0, 1]
line. Suppose the media outlet’s owner chooses an editor with idiosyncratic preferences xe.
Then, the profit function is:
Π(xe, xˆe, x˜e) = D(xe, xˆe, x˜e) = F (x˜e)− F (xˆe)
where F (x˜e) and F (xˆe) are increasing functions of xe. Hence, the media outlet owner will
choose an editor with preferences xmone such that:
dΠ(xe)
dxe
∣∣∣∣
xe=xmone
= 0
The following proposition characterizes under which conditions a profit-maximizing media
outlet will choose a moderate editor and under which conditions it will choose an ideological
one.
Proposition 2 Suppose there is just a monopolist profit-maximizing media outlet in the
market for news. For any symmetric f(x), then:
1. If
∂f(x)
∂x
 ≥ 0 for x ≤
1
2
≤ 0 for x > 1
2
(Condition A)
then the media outlet will always choose a moderate editor (i.e., xmone =
1
2
).
2. If
∂f(x)
∂x
 < 0 for x <
1
2
> 0 for x ≥ 1
2
(Condition B)
then the media outlet will always choose an ideological editor with preferences xmone ∈[
xmineL ,
1
2
) ∪ (1
2
, xmaxeR
]
The above proposition shows that a monopolist media outlet will always choose a moderate
editor when citizens are distributed uniformly or when the mass of moderate citizens is
higher than the one of ideological ones (i.e., when Condition A applies). Instead, if the
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number of moderate citizens is lower than the one of ideological ones, the media outlet will
prefer to choose an ideological editor (i.e., when Condition B applies). Indeed, in such a
case the media outlet may increase its demand since many ideological citizens are willing to
watch its news reports. At the same time, most moderate citizens will still want to acquire
information from such a source rather than not acquiring any information at all.
Hence, when the media outlet is just maximizing profits, even though citizens do not
derive any exogenous utility from biased information, the endogenous acquisition of costly
information may induce a media outlet to choose an editor whose optimal information
acquisition strategy is slanted in favor of the alternative ex-ante preferred by a subset of
citizens (e.g., the rightists one).
However, even in this case the optimal editor will not be “too extremist”. Ideological
citizens will indeed trade-off the benefit of having an editor with similar preferences and
the cost of having an editor who will sample relatively less, i.e., whose news reports have a
lower expected accuracy. Hence, as shown by Lemma 1, after some point, choosing a more
rightist (leftist) editor will decrease even the number of rightist (leftist) citizens willing to
watch the media outlet, i.e., for xe > x
max
eR
(xe < x
min
eL
).
5.2 Duopoly
Suppose now that K = 2. That is, the market for news is composed of two profit maximizing
media outlets. The following proposition summarizes the possible Nash equilibria that can
arise in this case depending on the distribution of citizens’ preferences.29
Proposition 3 Suppose there are two media outlets in the market for news. For any sym-
metric f(x), then:
1. If Condition A is satisfied, then both media outlets will choose moderate editors (i.e.,
xe1 = xe2 =
1
2
).
2. If Condition B is satisfied then ∃CDev < Cmax such that:
(a) If C > CDev,then both media outlets will choose moderate editors (i.e., xe1 =
xe2 =
1
2
)
(b) If C < CDev, then the two media outlets will choose ideological editors having
symmetric idiosyncratic preferences, i.e., xe1 = 1−xe2 where xe1 , xe2 ∈
[
xmineL ,
1
2
)∪(
1
2
, xmaxeR
]
. Moreover, the lower is C the higher is |xe1 − xe2|.
29Each citizen is implicitly assumed to watch at most one media outlet (which is, for example, the case
when two television news programs broadcast at the same time or when there is an upper bound on the
opportunity cost of watching news, e.g., time constraint). Nevertheless, as discussed in section 6.4, this
assumption is without loss of generality. If citizens were to acquire information from multiple sources, the
incentives of media outlets to choose ideological editors would only be reinforced.
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When Condition A holds, despite the fact that by choosing, for example, a rightist editor
a media outlet would increase the number of rightist citizens willing to watch its news (i.e.,
higher marginal rightist viewer), the net effect on the demand of choosing this editor rather
than a moderate one would be always negative. Since choosing a less moderate editor also
implies choosing an editor who will sample relatively less with respect to a more moderate
one, the negative effect on moderate citizens’ viewership would be higher than the positive
effect on rightist citizens’ viewership.
Moreover, even when Condition B holds, if the opportunity cost of acquiring information
is high, the two media outlets will both choose moderate editors. This is the only case where
a media outlet may not find it convenient to choose an ideological editor in a duopoly while
it would in a monopoly. The reason behind this difference is that in the monopoly case
choosing, for example, a rightist editor instead of a moderate one will decrease the demand
for news by leftist citizens. However, moderate citizens will still be willing to watch such
media outlet rather than not acquire any information at all. Instead, in the duopoly case,
when the opportunity cost of acquiring information is high, by choosing a rightist editor, a
media outlet may face a reduction in the demand for its news by moderate citizens larger
than the increase in the demand by rightist citizens.
On the other hand, when the opportunity cost is low, the demand for news by extremist
citizens will be high enough to induce media outlets to choose ideological editors. Thus, the
two media outlets will end up choosing specular types of ideological editors. That is, while
in the monopolistic case there was only a rightist (or leftist) editor, in presence of two media
outlets there will be also a leftist (or rightist) editor. Moreover, the lower is the opportunity
cost, the higher will be the difference between the idiosyncratic preferences of the editors
chosen by the two media outlets. Finally, given the results of Lemma 1, even in this case
optimal editors could never be “too extremist”.
5.3 Multiple Media Outlets
This section analyzes the case where there are multiple media outlets in the market for
news, i.e., K > 2. The above analysis has shown that when moderate citizens are uniformly
distributed in the policy space, or when the mass of moderate citizens is higher than the one
of ideological citizens, media outlets will choose moderate editors both in a monopoly and
in a duopoly. The following proposition shows that when there are multiple media outlets
in the market for news, this is not always the case. Specifically, when xi ∼ U [0, 1], as the
number of media outlets present in the market increases, the equilibrium where every media
outlet chooses a moderate editor is not sustainable anymore. Indeed, any media outlet would
have an incentive to differentiate its “news product” by choosing an ideological editor.
Proposition 4 Suppose that citizen’s idiosyncratic preferences are distributed uniformly
in [0, 1].Then, ∃K∗ ∈ (2,∞) such that for K > K∗ the set {xej = 12 ,∀j = 1, ..., K} is
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not anymore an equilibrium. In such case, it still exists a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, K∗ is increasing in C.
The above proposition shows that when the market for “moderate news” gets crowded,
media outlets will prefer to choose a different location for their news product. That is, the
higher the degree of competition in the market for news, the more likely it is that media
outlets will choose ideological editors. This result is consistent with the emerging empirical
evidence comparing the degree of ideological polarization of news sources in the online
market for news with respect to the oﬄine media market, e.g., online newspapers and blogs
with respect to traditional newspapers and TV. Indeed, the higher number of competing
media outlets present in the online market for news seems to be associated with a higher
degree of ideological polarization with respect to the oﬄine market for news (Sunstein, 2007;
Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011).
At the same time, even though more competition brings more slant in news reports, it
still has a positive effect on citizens’ welfare since it allows a fraction of the population (i.e.,
very liberal and very conservative citizens) to access a valuable source of information and
another one (i.e., liberal-moderates and conservative-moderates citizens) to choose a source
of information yielding a higher expected utility. Hence, more competition brings more
viewpoint diversity which has indeed a positive effect on citizens’ welfare. Nevertheless,
it is important to point out that, in a more general framework, the effects of competition
on citizens’ welfare could be more subtle. Specifically, in a repeated game, the short run
polarization of beliefs is going to reinforce the demand for news coming from like-minded
sources (see Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006). Hence, this may result in a long run polarization
of beliefs and, thus, of choices by different citizens.30
Moreover, since the higher the opportunity cost of acquiring information, the less extrem-
ists citizens will find it optimal to acquire information, as such cost increases the likelihood
of media outlets choosing ideological editors decreases.31 That is, it is possible to reinterpret
the above proposition with respect to C. For a given K > 2, there will exist a C∗(K) such
that for C > C∗(K), all media outlets will choose a moderate editor from the population of
citizens. Instead, for C < C∗(K), media outlets will choose ideological editors. This result,
along with the ones of Propositions 2 and 3, suggests that more moderate editors should be
expected to prevail in a news market where the opportunity cost is high. A clear applica-
tion of this result is represented by the differences between the broadcast media sector with
respect to the press. The opportunity cost of watching a report from a broadcast media is
arguably lower than the one of reading a newspaper. The analysis thus suggests that, all
other things equal, more moderate editors should be present in the press sector than in the
30See also Suen (2004) for a model with heterogeneous priors and coarse information leading to a “short-
run” polarization of beliefs. On the other hand, when media bias originates from the supply-side, a higher
degree of competition typically decreases media bias and increases citizens’ welfare (Besley and Prat 2006,
Ellman and Germano 2009, Anderson and McLaren 2010, Germano and Meier 2010).
31Indeed lim
C→Cmax
K∗ →∞.
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broadcast media sector. At the same time, there should be more extremist citizens watching
broadcast media and a higher overall demand for broadcast media with respect to the one
faced by the press.
6 Discussion
6.1 Scope of the model
While the main application of the paper focuses on the citizens’ choice between alternative
candidates, the framework easily extends to a broader set of applications beyond the political
environment. Specifically, the model provides a general economic rationale for endogenous
preferences for like-minded sources of information. Suppose, for example, that a consumer
is interested in buying a car and she is undecided between a domestic and a foreign car.
Her decision is likely to depend both on her idiosyncratic taste (e.g., esthetic idiosyncratic
valuation of the car) and on the quality of these two types of cars (i.e., the “valence” of the
car). What is the best source of information for a consumer facing this choice? (i.e., which
kind of car magazine would she find optimal to read?). The model suggests that a consumer
whose idiosyncratic preferences are more in favor of the domestic car would like to read a
car magazine whose editor share similar idiosyncratic preferences in favor of domestic cars.
A similar intuition applies to a situation where an individual has to decide whether to invest
in a risky or in a safe asset. The model predicts that individuals who are very risk adverse
should acquire information from a media outlet with a very risk adverse editor and viceversa.
In turn, this implies that different media outlets will find optimal to choose editors with
different idiosyncratic preferences (i.e., different optimal information acquisition strategies)
who will cater to different audiences.
6.2 Private Value of Information and Utility
As usual in the literature on the demand for news (e.g., Stro¨mberg, 2004b; Mullainathan and
Shleifer, 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006; Chan and Suen, 2008; Anderson and McLaren,
2010) I have assumed that citizens receive utility from choosing a given candidate/alternative
per se.32 Since news has a public-good nature and the probability of being pivotal is close
to zero, the expected benefit of acquiring information is likely to be negligible. That is,
acquiring information is a typical free-riding problem. Hence, in my model, as in the rest of
this literature, it is necessary to explain why citizens bother spending the opportunity cost
of watching TV news or reading newspapers.
A straightforward rationale for the demand for news is the one proposed by Stro¨mberg
(2004b) and Anderson and McLaren (2010). That is, citizens may be using news reports
32Similarly, the model shares with this literature the implicit assumption that a citizen must watch the
news report in order to learn its information content.
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to decide on a private action whose value depends on the public policy implemented (or
candidate elected). For example, the news could cover the quality and virtues of the public
school system and the private decision is the choice between enrolling in a public or in a
private school. That is, the willingness to acquire information on the state of the world
“in order to make a more informed private decision generates a market demand for news,
and through the voting system affects the direction of the public decision” (Anderson and
McLaren 2010, page 9).33
6.3 Media Outlets’ Profits and Information Acquisition
Since the main focus of the paper is on the demand for slanted news, the model provides a
stylized representation of media outlets’ profits. Considering a more general compensation
mechanism for the editor would affect both the revenues and the costs of a media outlet.
Once on the job, editors (and journalists) are the ones who will spend time and exert effort
to collect evidence on any given issue. That is, media outlets do not directly bear this day
to day cost of information acquisition. Nevertheless, in order to increase its profits, a media
outlet may try to induce its editor to change her optimal information acquisition strategy
by designing an incentive mechanism. As shown by Lemma 1, ideally all citizens would
like to watch a media outlet whose editor keeps acquiring information until she learns the
true state of the world (i.e., n∗e = −∞, n¯∗e = ∞). However, it is not feasible for the media
outlet to induce the editor to adopt such a sampling strategy. This is true for two simple
reasons: i) information acquisition is costly for the editor and hence it is also costly for
the media outlet to compensate the editor for acquiring extra pieces of information; ii) the
media outlet cannot monitor the information gathered by the editor (i.e., the media outlet
cannot observe the draws sampled by the editor). Nevertheless, a media outlet may induce
an editor to choose stopping rules which are higher (in absolute value) with respect to the
ones she would choose in the absence of any incentive mechanism. In this perspective, a
simple incentive mechanism that the media outlet could implement is to offer to the editor
a share α of the media outlet’s profits. This would induce the editor to choose higher (in
absolute value) stopping rules. Indeed, in the absence of perfect monitoring, an incentive
scheme rewarding the editor for each extra piece of evidence collected would produce the
same results of a decrease in the marginal cost of sampling c (i.e., any signal acquired is more
valuable or, equivalently, less costly). That is, as shown by Proposition 1, a lower c induces
an editor to acquire more information.34 Similarly, the media outlet (or, more generally,
the market for news) may provide an editor with a “reputation premium” when her news
reports turn out to be accurate (i.e., when endorsing the high-valence candidate). That is,
the editor may receive an extra positive payoff when her choice over candidates match the
33See also Piolatto and Schuett (2011) for a model of the demand for news by ethical voters.
34Notice that a media outlet may also decrease c by giving the editor more resources to produce the news
reports (e.g., more correspondents, better technology, more resources to investigate an issue, etc.).
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true state of the world. It is immediate to see how such an incentive mechanism is equivalent
to increasing the value of the valence parameter δ in the editor’s utility function. Hence, as
shown by Proposition 1, the presence of a “reputation premium” would induce editors to
acquire more information before producing a news report.
Therefore, incentive mechanisms aimed at decreasing the (net) marginal cost of sampling
or at increasing the editor’s valence parameter would, indeed, increase the informativeness
of the editor’s news reports. Nevertheless, such incentive mechanisms would not change
the main results of the model since the stopping rules of ideological editors would still be
asymmetric. Indeed, as shown by Proposition 1, the presence of a private value component
in the editor’s utility function always results in an ideological editor adopting a slanted
information acquisition strategy.35
Moreover, it would be extremely costly for a media outlet to induce a moderate editor
to gather an amount of information such that even extremists citizens would consider this
media outlet a valuable source of information.36 In addition, as discussed in section 4,
while all citizens with preferences xˆe|xe= 12 < xi < x˜e|xe= 12 find the information coming
from a moderate editor valuable, some of them would find the information coming from an
editor with similar idiosyncratic preferences even more valuable. Hence, there will always
be a demand for “slanted” news by ideological citizens that a media outlet may capture by
hiring an ideological editor.37
6.4 Multiple Sources of Information
Throughout the analysis, it was assumed that citizens watch at most one media outlet.
Nevertheless, while such assumption greatly simplifies the analysis, the intuition and the
main results of the model do not rely on it. Indeed, if citizens were to acquire information
from multiple sources, the incentives of media outlets to choose ideological editors would
only be reinforced. For any citizen, watching two media outlets with a moderate editor has
the same value of watching only one. Specifically, after having observed the news report of a
moderate editor, watching an additional media outlet with another moderate editor would
either not change the citizen’s ranking of preferences, or it would lead citizen’s posterior
beliefs to be equal to the prior (i.e., the two reports would just “cancel” each other). Hence,
if citizens could access multiple sources of information, the incentives of media outlets to
differentiate their products by hiring ideological editors would, indeed, be higher.
35Moreover, the cost of acquiring information by editors may be also reinterpreted as a discount factor
(see Brocas and Carrillo 2009). In such case, each editor has to decide when to stop gathering information.
Hence, by inducing an editor to sample more, a media outlet would also delay the release of the news report
which may have a negative effect on the demand for it and, hence, on the profits.
36Indeed, xˆe → 0 and x˜e → 1 if and only if n∗e → −∞, n¯∗e →∞, δ → 1/2 and C → 0.
37Moreover, it would be cheaper for a media outlet to capture such demand for “slanted” news of non-
moderate citizens by hiring an editor with similar idiosyncratic preferences, rather than hiring a moderate
one and provide her with incentives to acquire a large amount of information in both directions.
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6.5 Editor’s Influence on Citizens
In the model the utility of the editor depends on her own choice. Nevertheless, even if the
editor’s utility were to depend on the citizens’ choice, the information acquisition strategy
of the editor would not change. Indeed, the only credible strategy by an editor with idiosyn-
cratic preferences xe is to report n
∗
e upon reaching n
∗
e and to report n¯
∗
e upon reaching n¯
∗
e.
Since citizens know the idiosyncratic preferences of the editor, even if she were to try to in-
fluence citizens’ choice by over-reporting the number of signals in favor of a given candidate,
citizens would still be able to perfectly discount her “bias” and infer the actual stopping
threshold (i.e., any n > n¯∗e would be interpreted as n¯
∗
e and any n < n
∗
e as n
∗
e).
Notice that the model could indeed be seen as a special case of a commitment-free mech-
anism of Bayesian persuasion, as defined by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), where the
Sender (the editor) can influence the choice of a rational Bayesian Receiver (the citizens)
by influencing her beliefs. Specifically, in my setting the fact that the Sender’s preferences
depend on the state of the world and acquiring signals is costly, mitigates the incentive com-
patibility constraints. That is, there is an endogenous commitment mechanism arising from
the editor’s idiosyncratic preferences and the cost of drawing a signal. The Receiver knows
that the only credible signal realization is the one implicitly defined by the two stopping
thresholds of the Sender (i.e., the editor can only credibly commit to such signal acquisition
strategy).38 Hence, since there is an alignment of preferences between the Sender and the
Receiver (i.e., all citizens willing to acquire information from a given editor will have the
same ex-post ranking of preferences as the one of the editor), the Sender will truthfully
reveal the signal realization.
Obviously, in the presence of uncertainty on the editor’s idiosyncratic preferences there
would also be uncertainty on the editor’s optimal stopping thresholds. That is, if citizens
only knew that xe ∼ g(x) with supp(x) =
[
xAe , x
B
e
]
and xAe < x
B
e , then they would also know
that n∗e ∼ g(n∗e(xe)) with supp [g(n∗e(xe))] =
[
nBe , n
A
e
]
where nBe = n
∗
e(x
B
e ) < n
A
e = n
∗
e(x
A
e ),
since there is a one-to-one mapping between preferences and optimal stopping thresholds.
Similarly, n¯∗e(xe) ∼ g(n¯∗e(xe)) with supp [g(n¯∗e(xe))] =
[
n¯Be , n¯
A
e
]
where n¯Be = n¯
∗
e(x
B
e ) < n¯
A
e =
n¯∗e(x
A
e ). In presence of such additional source of uncertainty, the editor will have an incentive
to over-report signals in favor of the preferred candidate once she has reached one of the
two stopping thresholds. That is, such uncertainty would introduce in the model a “supply-
driven” bias in news reports since the editor would have an incentive to bias its news reports
by selectively omitting a subset of her information. Nevertheless, if the editor had to report
n¯Ae , citizens’ posterior beliefs would be µ(n¯
A
e ) = µ(E(n¯
∗
e(xe)|n¯Ae )).39 That is, citizens will still
be able to infer the interval in which the optimal editor’s stopping threshold lies and discount
their posterior beliefs accordingly. Hence, the main mechanism and intuition of the model
38Any other mechanism would, simply, not be credible. The stopping thresholds represent the net differ-
ence in the number of signals in favor of one candidate. Hence, once the editor has reached one of the two
thresholds, she has always an incentive to hide signals against the endorsed candidate.
39Similarly, upon reporting n¯Be , citizens’ posterior beliefs would be µ(n¯
B
e ) = µ(E(n¯
∗
e(xe)|n¯Be )).
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would not change. Obviously, the more ideologically distant from the endorsed candidate
the editor is believed to be, the more influential her reports will be. In other words, the
editor’s endorsement will be stronger: i) the more moderate the editor is believed to be,
upon endorsing the ideologically closer candidate; ii) the less moderate the editor is believed
to be, upon endorsing the ideologically least preferred candidate. Hence, in most of the cases
(i.e., when endorsing the ideologically closer candidate), an editor would like to be believed
to be as “unbiased” (i.e., moderate) as possible.40
7 Conclusions
The paper has analyzed a market for news in which profit maximizing media outlets choose
their editors from the population of citizens. The results identify a novel mechanism of
media bias: the bias in a media outlet’s news reports may be the result of the slanted
optimal information acquisition strategy of its editor.
The analysis has shown that the editors’ endogenous information acquisition results in
rational citizens finding it optimal to choose a like-minded source of information (i.e., watch
a media outlet having an editor with similar idiosyncratic preferences). Indeed, citizens may
obtain a higher expected utility from the set of information acquired by a like-minded editor
with respect to the one acquired by a moderate editor. Consequently, profit maximizing
media outlets may choose ideological editors in order to capture the demand for news of
ideological citizens. Hence, even though citizens do not derive any exogenous utility from
biased information, they all share the same prior beliefs and media outlets are just maxi-
mizing profits, the endogenous acquisition of costly information may induce a media outlet
to choose an editor whose optimal information acquisition strategy is “slanted” in favor of
the alternative ex-ante preferred by a subset of citizens. Therefore, my model provides a
novel rationale for the presence of slant in the market for news purely based on the citizens’
demand for the most valuable source of information. At the same time, the results also show
that there is always an upper bound on the possible “extremism” of an editor above which
the demand for news by rational citizens is strictly decreasing.
In a market for news where the opportunity cost of acquiring information for citizens
is low, there will be a higher demand by ideological citizens. Thus, ideological editors are
more likely to be chosen by media outlets in such market with respect to a market where the
opportunity cost of acquiring information is high. A straightforward application of this result
lies in the differences between the broadcast media and the press. The model predicts that
more moderate editors should be present in the press sector than in the broadcast media
sector. Moreover, broadcast media outlets should face a higher demand from extremist
citizens (and a higher demand overall) with respect to the one faced by the press.
40Indeed, consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model, the empirical analysis of Chiang and
Knight (2011) shows that the degree of influence of a newspaper on voters depends on the “credibility” of
the endorsement.
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The results also show that the higher the degree of competition in the market for news, the
more likely that media outlets will choose ideological editors. That is, when the market for
news gets crowded, a media outlet may prefer to differentiate its news product by choosing
a different location in the policy space (i.e., choose an editor with different idiosyncratic
characteristics), rather than sharing the demand for news of moderate citizens with the
other media outlets. Thus, this result provides an economic rationale for the higher degree
of ideological polarization of news media observed in the online market for news with respect
to the oﬄine market for news (Sunstein, 2007; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011).
Even though more competition brings more slant in news reports, it still has a positive
effect on citizens’ welfare since it allows a fraction of the population to access a valuable
source of information and another one to choose a source of information yielding a higher
expected utility. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that in a more general framework
the effects of competition on citizens’ welfare may not be so straightforward. In a repeated
game, the short run polarization of beliefs would reinforce the demand for news coming from
like-minded sources which, in turn, may lead to a long run polarization of beliefs and, thus,
of choices by different citizens. More generally, this paper has focused only on the demand
for slanted news. In order to carefully assess the effects of competition on citizens’ welfare,
policy regulators should take into account the possible presence of both demand-driven and
supply-driven sources of media bias in the market for news.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The problem involves analyzing a stochastic process with two absorbing states. Specifically, the
equations characterizing these two absorbing states (i.e., n∗e and n¯∗e) must be determined. After
m draws, given that a current difference in signals in favor of r equal to n, the value function of
editor e is given by (9). This is a standard problem of sequential testing of two simple hypotheses
(see Chapter 4 in Shiryaev, 2007). Hence, it can be proven that n¯∗e and n∗e are defined implicitly
by the following two first order conditions:41
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)
= 0
∂Ve
∂n∗e
|n=n∗e =
(lnλ)λn
∗
e
λn
∗
e − λn¯∗e
[
(2x− 1)
(
λn¯
∗
e + 1
)
+
(
1− λn¯∗e
)
(2δ −H (n¯∗e − n∗e))
]
+H
(
λn
∗
e − 1
)
= 0
where H = c2θ−1 and λ =
1−θ
θ < 1. Where it must be always the case that n
∗
e < 0 and n¯
∗
e > 0.
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It is also immediate to verify that for xe =
1
2 it must be the case that n¯
∗
e = |n∗e| . Notice that the
optimal stopping rule n¯∗e and n∗e do not depend on n. That is the optimal stopping rule do not
change depending on the realization of the signals.43 Let’s consider the two first order conditions
and let’s denote them as f and g. That is:
f =
∂Ve
∂n¯∗e
|n¯∗e = 0 (18)
g =
∂Ve
∂n∗e
|n=n∗e = 0 (19)
that is n¯∗e and n∗e are the solution of the following system of equations:{
f(n¯∗e(xe, δ, c), n∗e(xe, δ, c), xe, δ, c) = 0
g(n¯∗e(xe, δ, c), n∗e(xe, δ, c), xe, δ, c) = 0
In order to obtain the comparative statics, it is necessary to derive the differential of these func-
tions.44 That is: {
∂f
∂n¯∗e
dn¯∗e +
∂f
∂n∗e
dn∗e +
∂f
∂xe
dxe +
∂f
∂δ dδ +
∂f
∂c dc = 0
∂g
∂n¯∗e
dn¯∗e +
∂g
∂n∗e
dn∗e +
∂g
∂xe
dxe +
∂g
∂δdδ +
∂g
∂cdc = 0
Let’s focus on the comparative statics with respect to xe. That is,
dn∗e
dxe
and dn¯
∗
e
dxe
must be determined,
41The online appendix contains an extended proof where these first order conditions are formally derived.
42Suppose not. That is n∗e > 0. Thus µ (n
∗
e) > µ (n = 0) = p. If xe >
1
2 , this would imply that µ (n
∗
e) > µˆe
and thus τe,m(n
∗
e) = R which contradicts the definition of n
∗
e. If xe <
1
2 , then since n = 0 < n
∗
e, this implies
that τe(n = 0) = L and thus the voter would never start sampling. A similar proof applies to show that
n¯∗e > 0.
43A detailed formal derivation of the second order conditions, ensuring that (n¯∗e, n
∗
e) is a global maximum,
is available upon request to the author.
44These comparative statics are determined by treating n as a real number. This mathematical abuse
is made for technical convenience (for an analogous treatment see Brocas and Carrillo 2009 and Brocas,
Carrillo and Palfrey 2011). At the same time, a marginal change in n¯∗e and/or n
∗
e has a straightforward
interpretation. For example, a marginal increase in the threshold required by a citizen-editor to endorse
candidate j simply represents a marginal increase in the probability of such a citizen-editor requiring one
more signal in favor of j to endorse her.
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holding the other parameter constants. Hence, dδ = 0 and dc = 0. Thus:
dn∗e
dxe
=
(
∂g
∂n¯∗e
∂f
∂xe
− ∂g∂xe
∂f
∂n¯∗e
)
(
∂g
∂n∗e
∂f
∂n¯∗e
− ∂g∂n¯∗e
∂f
∂n∗e
)
similarly
dn¯∗e
dxe
=
(
∂g
∂n∗e
∂f
∂xe
− ∂f∂n∗e
∂g
∂xe
)
(
∂g
∂n¯∗e
∂f
∂n∗e
− ∂f∂n¯∗e
∂g
∂n∗e
)
Then, simple calculations yields:
dn∗e
dxe
= − 2λ
n∗e
(
λn¯
∗
e + 1
)
H (λn
∗
e − λn¯∗e ) (λn∗e + 1) < 0 (20)
and
dn¯∗e
dxe
= − 2λ
n¯∗e
(
λn
∗
e + 1
)
H (λn¯∗e + 1) (λn
∗
e − λn¯∗e ) < 0 (21)
Moreover,
∣∣∣dn¯∗edxe ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣dn∗edxe ∣∣∣ if and only if:
(λn
∗
e − λn¯∗e )
(
1− λn∗eλn¯∗e
)
< 0
thus since
(1− λn∗eλn¯∗e )

> 0 for xe < 1/2
= 0 for xe = 1/2
< 0 for xe > 1/2
(22)
the result follows. Let’s now focus on the comparative statics with respect to δ. Using the same
methodology as the one described above:
dn∗e
dδ
= − 2λ
n∗e
(
1− λn¯∗e)
H (λn
∗
e + 1) (λn
∗
e − λn¯∗e ) < 0
and
dn¯∗e
dδ
=
2λn¯
∗
e
(
λn
∗
e − 1)
H (λn¯∗e + 1) (λn
∗
e − λn¯∗e ) > 0
Moreover,
∣∣∣dn¯∗edδ ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣dn∗edδ ∣∣∣ if and only if:
(λn¯
∗
e + λn
∗
e )
(
λn
∗
eλn¯
∗
e − 1
)
> 0
hence given (22) the results follow. Finally, the comparative statics with respect to c are:
dn∗e
dc
=
(2θ − 1)λn∗e ((2x− 1) (λn¯∗e + 1)+ 2δ (1− λn¯∗e))
c2 (λn
∗
e + 1) (λn
∗
e − λn¯∗e ) > 0
hence
dn¯∗e
dc
=
λn¯
∗
e (2θ − 1) ((2x− 1) (1 + λn∗e )− 2δ(λn∗e − 1))
(λn
∗
e − λn¯∗e ) c2 (λn¯∗e + 1) < 0 Q.E.D.
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Proof of Corollary 1
Since
Pr(τe = L|s = r) = 2µ(n¯
∗
e)− 1
µ(n¯∗e)− µ(n∗e)
µ(n∗e)
and
Pr(τe = R|s = l) = 1− 2µ(n
∗
e)
µ(n¯∗e)− µ(n∗e)
[1− µ(n¯∗e)]
Thus it is easy to verify that Pr(τe = L|s = r) is decreasing in xe and Pr(τe = R|s = l) is increasing
in xe. Moreover, the ex-ante probability of making a wrong choice is:
Pr(error) = Pr(s = r) Pr(τe = L|s = r) + Pr(s = l) Pr(τe = R|s = l)
hence:
Pr(error) =
λn¯
∗
e (λn
∗
e − 1) + (1− λn¯∗e )
2 (λn
∗
e − λn¯∗e )
It is now possible to perform the comparative statics upon this probability. First of all:
∂ Pr(error)
∂n¯∗e
=
1
2
(lnλ)λn¯
∗
e
(
λn
∗
e − 1)2
(λn
∗
e − λn¯∗e )2 < 0
∂ Pr(error)
∂n∗e
= −1
2
(lnλ)λn
∗
e
(
1− λn¯∗e)2
(λn
∗
e − λn¯∗e )2 > 0
Hence, since dn¯
∗
e
dc < 0 and
dn∗e
dc > 0, then
dPr(error)
dc > 0. Similarly, since
dn¯∗e
dδ > 0 and
dn∗e
dδ < 0, then
dPr(error)
dδ < 0.
Finally given (20) and (21) derived in the proof of Proposition 1, dPr(error)dxe > 0 if and only if:(
λ2n
∗
e − λ2n¯∗e) (1 + λn∗eλn¯∗e) (1− λn∗eλn¯∗e)
(λn
∗
e + 1) (λn¯∗e + 1)
< 0
Thus, given (22):
dPr(error)
dxe

< 0 for x < 12
= 0 for x = 12
> 0 for x > 12
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1
It is immediate to verify that (x˜e − xˆe) is decreasing in C. Let’s now focus on x˜e. Then:
dx˜e(n¯
∗
e, n
∗
e)
dn¯∗e
= −C (lnλ) λ
n¯∗e
(
λn
∗
e − 1)
(λn
∗
e + 1) (1− λn¯∗e )2 > 0
dx˜e(n¯
∗
e, n
∗
e)
dn∗e
= (lnλ)
λn
∗
e
(λn
∗
e + 1)2
(
2δ − C
(
λn¯
∗
e + 1
)
(1− λn¯∗e )
)
< 0
The it is immediate to verify that x˜e is increasing in δ. Let’s now analyze how x˜e changes as xe
increases. First, I want to prove that for any xe < 1/2 it is always the case that dx˜e/dxe > 0. From
the proof of Proposition 1 we know that for xe < 1/2,
∣∣∣dn∗edxe ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣dn¯∗edxe ∣∣∣ . Hence, a sufficient condition
to ensure that dx˜e/dxe > 0 is simply:∣∣∣∣dx˜e(n¯∗e, n∗e)dn∗e
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣dx˜e(n¯∗e, n∗e)dn¯∗e
∣∣∣∣
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which is true if and only if:
C
(
λn¯
∗
e
(
λ2n
∗
e − 1)
λn
∗
e (1− λn¯∗e )2 +
(
λn¯
∗
e + 1
)
(1− λn¯∗e )
)
< 2δ
Since ∂∂n¯∗e
(
1−λn¯∗e
1+λn¯
∗
e
)
> 0 and dn¯
∗
e
dxe
< 0, then δ
(
1−λn¯∗e
1+λn¯
∗
e
)
≥ Cmax. Hence, a sufficient condition for the
above condition to be always true is:
(λn¯
∗
eλn
∗
e − 1)
(
λn¯
∗
e + λn
∗
e
)
< 0
which it is always the case for xe < 1/2. Moreover, for xe = 1/2, n
∗
e = −n¯∗e and thus:
dx˜e
dxe
∣∣∣∣
xe=1/2
= − 4
H
(lnλ)
λ2n¯
∗
e
(
δ(1− λn¯∗e )− C(λn¯∗e + 1))
(1− λ2n¯∗e ) ((1− λ3n¯∗e ) + λn¯∗e (1− λn¯∗e )) > 0
Hence, for any xe ≤ 1/2, it is always the case that dx˜e/dxe > 0. Let’s analyze now the case where
xe > 1/2. Then, dx˜e/dxe > 0 if and only if:
C < C˜ ≡ 2δ λ
2n∗e
(
1− λ2n¯∗e)2
λ2n¯∗e (λ2n
∗
e − 1) (λn∗e + 1)2 + λ2n∗e (λn¯∗e + 1)2 (1− λ2n¯∗e ) (23)
hence C˜ > 0. Let’s now analyze how C˜ changes when xe increases:
∂C˜
∂n¯∗e
= − 4δ (lnλ)
(
1− λ2n¯∗e)λ2n∗e+n¯∗e
λ2n¯∗e (λn
∗
e + 1)2 (λ2n
∗
e − 1) + λ2n∗e (λn¯∗e + 1)2 (1− λ2n¯∗e )Y > 0
where
Y =
2λm+
(
1− λ2n¯∗e
) [(
λ2n
∗
e
(
λn¯
∗
e+1
) (
1− λ2n¯∗e
)
− (λn¯∗e+1)2 λ2n∗e+n¯∗e+λn¯∗e (λn∗e+1)2 (λ2k−1))](
λ2n¯∗e (λn
∗
e + 1)2 (λ2n
∗
e − 1) +λ2k (λn¯∗e + 1)2 (1− λ2n¯∗e )
)
 > 0
since λn¯
∗
e
(
λn
∗
e + 1
)2 (
λ2n
∗
e − 1) > (λn¯∗e + 1)2 λ2n∗e+n¯∗e > 0. Moreover:
∂C˜
∂n∗e
= −4δ (lnλ)λ
2n∗e
(
λn¯
∗
e − 1)2 (λn¯∗e + 1)2 (λn∗e + λ4n∗e + λ3n∗e + 1) (λ2n¯∗e)(
λ2n¯∗e (λn
∗
e + 1)2 (λ2n
∗
e − 1) + λ2n∗e (λn¯∗e + 1)2 (1− λ2n¯∗e )
)2 > 0
hence since dn¯
∗
e
dxe
< 0 and
dn∗e
dxe
< 0 :
dC˜
dxe
=
∂C˜
∂n¯∗e
dn¯∗e
dxe
+
∂C˜
∂n∗e
dn∗e
dxe
< 0
Hence, x˜e will be increasing in xe for xe > 1/2 if and only if C < C˜. That is, since
dC˜
dxe
< 0, x˜e will
be increasing in xe only as long as xe < x
max
eR
, where:
C˜
(
n¯∗e(x
max
eR
), n∗e(x
max
eR
)
)
= C
Moreover, since dC˜dxe < 0, C˜
max < lim
xe→1/2
C˜ = Cmax. Finally, since δ ∈ (0, 12], xmaxeR < 1. Specifically,
for δ < 1/2 an editor with preferences xeR = 1 would never endorse a leftist candidate since,
trivially, µˆ(xeR=1)
= 0 (i.e., n¯∗e(xeR = 1) = 0) which implies that C˜(xeR = 1) = 0. For δ = 1/2, an
editor with preferences xeR = 1 will endorse a leftist candidate if and only if µ(n) = 0. That is, if
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and only if n = −∞. Hence, necessary conditions for this to be verified are ne(xeR = 1) → −∞
and n¯e(xeR = 1)→ 0. As shown by Proposition 1, for xe > 12 it is the case that
∣∣∣dn¯∗edxe ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣dn∗edxe ∣∣∣ . That
is, when xeR → 1 it must be the case that n¯∗eR → 0 but n¯∗eR −
∣∣n∗eR∣∣ 9 −∞. In turn, this implies
that C˜ → 0 when xeR → 1.
Let’s now focus on xˆe. Then:
dxˆe
dn¯∗e
= (lnλ)
λn¯
∗
e
(
2δ(λn
∗
e − 1)− C(λn∗e + 1))
(λn
∗
e − 1) (λn¯∗e + 1)2 < 0
dxˆe
dn∗e
= −C (lnλ)λn∗e 1− λ
n¯∗e
(λn¯∗e + 1) (λn
∗
e − 1)2 > 0
Thus it is immediate to verify that xˆe is decreasing in δ. Let’s now analyze how xˆe changes as xe
increases. First, I want to prove that for any xe > 1/2 it is always the case that dxˆe/dxe > 0. As
shown in the proof of Proposition 1, for xe > 1/2, then
∣∣∣dn∗edxe ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣dn¯∗edxe ∣∣∣ . Hence, a sufficient condition
to ensure that dxˆe/dxe > 0 is simply:∣∣∣∣dxˆe(n¯∗e, n∗e)dn∗e
∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∣dxˆe(n¯∗e, n∗e)dn¯∗e
∣∣∣∣
that is
C
(
λn
∗
e
(
1− λ2n¯∗e)
λn¯∗e (λn
∗
e − 1)2 +
(λn
∗
e + 1)
(λn
∗
e − 1)
)
< 2δ
moreover since Cmax ≤ 1−λn¯
∗
e
(λn¯∗e+1)
δ < δ λ
n∗e−1
(λn∗e+1)
, a sufficient condition for the above to be verified
becomes:
(1− λn¯∗eλn∗e ) (λn¯∗e + λn∗e)
λn¯∗e (λ2n
∗
e − 1) < 0
hence since (1− λn¯∗eλn∗e ) < 0 for xe > 1/2, we have proved that for xe > 1/2 it is always the case
that dxˆe/dxe > 0. Moreover, for xe = 1/2, n
∗
e = −n¯∗e and thus:
dxˆe
dxe
∣∣∣∣
xe=1/2
= − 4
H
(lnλ)
λ2n¯
∗
e
(
δ(1− λn¯∗e )− C(λn¯∗e + 1))
(1− λ2n¯∗e ) ((1− λ3n¯∗e ) + λn¯∗e (1− λn¯∗e )) > 0
Hence, for any xe ≥ 1/2, it is always the case that dxˆe/dxe > 0. Let’s now analyze the case where
xe < 1/2. In this case, dxˆe/dxe > 0 if and only if:
C < Cˆ ≡ 2δ λ
2n¯∗e
(
λ2n
∗
e − 1)2
λ2n
∗
e (1− λ2n¯∗e ) (λn¯∗e + 1)2 + λ2n¯∗e (λ2n∗e − 1) (λn∗e + 1)2 (24)
hence Cˆ > 0. Let’s now analyze how Cˆ changes when xe increases. First of all:
∂Cˆ
∂n¯∗e
= 4δ (lnλ)λ2n¯
∗
e
(
λ2n
∗
e − 1)2 (λn¯∗e + λ4n¯∗e + λ3n¯∗e + 1) (λ2n∗e)(
λ2n¯∗e (λn
∗
e + 1)2 (λ2n
∗
e − 1) + λ2n∗e (λn¯∗e + 1)2 (1− λ2n¯∗e )
)2 < 0
and
∂Cˆ
∂n∗e
=
4δ (lnλ)
(
λ2n
∗
e − 1)λn∗e+2n¯∗e(
λ2n¯∗e (λn
∗
e + 1)2 (λ2n
∗
e − 1) + λ2n∗e (λn¯∗e + 1)2 (1− λ2n¯∗e )
)2W < 0
where
W = 2λn¯
∗
eλn
∗
e
(
(λ2n
∗
e − λ2n¯∗e ) +
(
1 + λ2n
∗
eλn¯
∗
e
)(
1− λn¯∗e
))
+
(
λn
∗
e − λ2n¯∗e
)(
λ2n
∗
e + λn
∗
eλ2n¯
∗
e + λ3n
∗
eλ2n¯
∗
e + 1
)
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hence since dn¯
∗
e
dxe
< 0 and
dn∗e
dxe
< 0 :
dCˆ
dxe
=
∂Cˆ
∂n¯∗e
dn¯∗e
dxe
+
∂Cˆ
∂n∗e
dn∗e
dxe
> 0
Hence, xˆe will be increasing in xe for xe < 1/2 if and only if C < Cˆ. That is, since
dCˆ
dxe
> 0, x˜e will
be increasing in xe only as long as xe > x
min
eL
, where xmineL is such that:
Cˆ
(
n¯∗e(x
min
eL
), n∗e(x
min
eL
)
)
= C
Moreover, since dCˆdxe > 0, Cˆ
max < lim
xe→1/2
Cˆ = Cmax. Finally, by using an analogous proof to the one
employed above to show that xmaxeR < 1, it is immediate to see that since δ ∈
(
0, 12
]
, it is always
the case that xmineL > 0 and that Cˆ → 0 when xeL → 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
The optimal strategy for a profit maximizing monopolist media outlet is to choose an editor with
idiosyncratic preference xe such that its profits are maximized. That is x
mon
e must be such that:
dΠ
dxe
=
dΠ
dn¯∗e
dn¯∗e
dxe
+
dΠ
dn∗e
dn∗e
dxe
= 0
Where:
dΠ
dn¯∗e
=
dF (x˜e)
dn¯∗e
− dF (xˆe)
dn¯∗e
dΠ
dn∗e
=
dF (x˜e)
dn∗e
− dF (xˆe)
dn∗e
where dF (x˜e)dn¯∗e
= ddn¯∗e
∫ x˜e(n¯∗e)
δ
f(x)dx. Hence applying Leibniz’s rule:
dF (x˜e)
dn¯∗e
=
d
dn¯∗e
∫ x˜e(n¯∗e ,n∗e)
δ
f(x)dx = f(x˜e(n¯
∗
e, n
∗
e))
dx˜e(n¯
∗
e, n
∗
e)
dn¯∗e
thus,
dΠ
dn¯∗e
= f(x˜e(n¯
∗
e, n
∗
e))
dx˜e(n¯
∗
e, n
∗
e)
dn¯∗e
− f(xˆe(n¯∗e, n∗e))
dxˆe(n¯
∗
e)
dn¯∗e
similarly
dΠ
dn∗e
= f(x˜e(n¯
∗
e, n
∗
e))
dx˜e(n¯
∗
e, n
∗
e)
dn∗e
− f(xˆe(n¯∗e, n∗e))
dxˆe(n¯
∗
e, n
∗
e)
dn∗e
Hence the first order condition becomes:
dx˜e/dxe
dxˆe/dxe
=
f(xˆe(n¯
∗
e, n
∗
e))
f(x˜e(n¯∗e, n∗e))
(25)
where:
dx˜e
dxe
=
−2 (lnλ)
H(λn
∗
e − λn¯∗e )
(
2δ
λ2n
∗
e
(
λn¯
∗
e + 1
)
(λn
∗
e + 1)3
− C
(
λ2n¯
∗
e
(
λn
∗
e − 1)
(λn¯∗e + 1) (1− λn¯∗e )2 +
λ2n
∗
e
(
λn¯
∗
e + 1
)2
(1− λn¯∗e ) (λn∗e + 1)3
))
dxˆe
dxe
=
−2 (lnλ)
H(λn
∗
e − λn¯∗e )
(
2δ
λ2n¯
∗
e
(
λn
∗
e + 1
)
(λn¯∗e + 1)3
− C
(
λ2n
∗
e
(
1− λn¯∗e)
(λn
∗
e + 1) (λn
∗
e − 1)2 +
λ2n¯
∗
e
(
λn
∗
e + 1
)2
(λn
∗
e − 1) (λn¯∗e + 1)3
))
From the proof of Lemma 1, we know that for xe = 1/2, dx˜e/dxe = dxˆe/dxe > 0. Hence, for
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xe = 1/2,
dx˜e/dxe
dxˆe/dxe
= 1. More generally, for any xe :
dx˜e
dxe
− dxˆe
dxe
= (1− λn∗eλn¯∗e )(λn∗e − λn¯∗e ) · α · β
where
α = 2δ
(
4λn¯
∗
eλn
∗
e +
(
λn
∗
e + λn¯
∗
e
)
(1 + λn
∗
eλn¯
∗
e )
)
(λn
∗
e + 1)3 (λn¯∗e + 1)3
and
β = 4C
(
λ2n¯
∗
e
(λn¯∗e+1)
2
(1−λ2n¯∗e )
+ λ
2n∗e
(λn∗e+1)
2
(λ2n∗e−1)
)
(λn
∗
e − 1) (1− λn¯∗e )
where α and β are always positive. Hence given (22):
dx˜e/dxe
dxˆe/dxe

> 1 for xe <
1
2
= 1 for xe =
1
2
< 1 for xe >
1
2
(26)
In other words, for xe >
1
2 an increase in xe increases xˆe more than x˜e (and viceversa for xe <
1
2).
Then, it is immediate to verify that when the distribution of citizens’ idiosyncratic preferences
is such that Condition A is verified, then xe =
1
2 is the unique stationary point and the global
maximum.
Now suppose F (x) is such that Condition B is verified. For xeR >
1
2 to be a stationary point it
must be the case that f(xˆeR(n¯
∗
e, n
∗
e)) < f(x˜eR(n¯
∗
e, n
∗
e)). Moreover, from Lemma 1 and (26) we know
that for xeR > 1/2, then x˜eR(n¯
∗
e, n
∗
e) > 1− xˆeR(n¯∗e, n∗e). Then, xe = 12 cannot be a global maximum
since df(x)dx
∣∣∣
x=1/2
> 0 and dx˜edxe
∣∣∣
x=1/2
= dxˆedxe
∣∣∣
x=1/2
. Thus the stationary point xmoneR >
1
2 such that
(25) is satisfied will be a global maximum on
(
1
2 , 1
)
. Then by the symmetry of f, choosing an editor
with symmetric preferences will also be profit-maximizing. That is, we have two global maxima
in this case xmoneR and x
mon
eL
= 1 − xmoneR . Indeed, since the distribution function f is symmetric
around 12 , so it must be the demand function. To sum up, if F (x) is such that Condition A holds
the global maximum is always at xe =
1
2 . Instead, if F (x) is such that Condition B holds, there
are two symmetric global maxima such that xeR = 1− xeL > 1/2. The last part of the proposition
follows immediately from Lemma 1 Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let’s start with the case where Condition A holds. We show that in this case the unique equilibrium
is such that x1e = x
2
e =
1
2 . Suppose that media outlet 1 deviates by choosing x
1
e > x
2
e =
1
2 . If media
outlet one deviates, the indifferent viewer, i.e., the viewer who will be indifferent between watching
media outlet 1 and media outlet 2 is the one having preferences xI such that UI(W1) = UI(W2).
That is:
xI(n¯
∗
e1 , n
∗
e1 , n¯
∗
e2) =
1
2
+
δ(
λn
∗
e1λn¯
∗
e1 − 1
)
(1− λn¯∗e2 )
(
λn
∗
e1 − λn¯∗e1
)
(
λn¯
∗
e2 + 1
) − (λn∗e1 − 1)(1− λn¯∗e1)

where since x2e =
1
2 , then n¯
∗
e2 = −n∗e2 . The no-deviation condition for media outlet 1 requires that
@xe > 12 such that the demand if deviating is higher than the demand if not deviating. Specifically,
the demand that media outlet 1 faces when not deviating is:
DNDev(x1e) = D
NDev
(
x2e
)
=
1
2
[
F ( x˜e|xe= 12 )− F ( xˆ|xe= 12 )
]
=
[
F ( x˜e|xe= 12 )− F
(
1
2
)]
(27)
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Instead the demand that media outlet 1 faces if it deviates is:
DDev(x1e) =
[
F ( x˜e|x1e)− F (max {xˆe1 ;xI(xe1)})
]
(28)
Notice that for any non-uniform distribution satisfying Condition A the mass of citizens is strictly
decreasing moving away from the mean of the distribution at 1/2. Hence it is enough to show
that this no-deviation condition holds even in the case where citizens’ preferences are uniformly
distributed in [0, 1].45 In the case of a uniform distribution, the following represents a sufficient
no-deviation condition:
xI(n¯
∗
e1 , n
∗
e1 , n¯
∗
e2)−
1
2
> x˜e|x1e − x˜e|xe= 12
hence media outlet 1 would not deviate if and only if:
C > CTHR = δ
(
λ2n
∗
e1 − 1
)(
1− λn¯∗e1
)
(
λn
∗
e1λn¯
∗
e1 − 1
)2

(
λn
∗
e1 − λn¯∗e1
)
(
λn
∗
e1 + 1
) − (1− λn¯∗e2 )(
λn¯
∗
e2 + 1
) (λn¯∗e1 + 1)

where CTHR > 0 if and only if (
λn
∗
e1 − λn¯∗e1
)
(
λn
∗
e1 + 1
)(
λn¯
∗
e1 + 1
) > (1− λn¯∗e2 )(
λn¯
∗
e2 + 1
)
Let A =
(
λ
n∗e1−λ
n¯∗e1
)
(
λ
n∗e1 +1
)(
λ
n¯∗e1 +1
) . For xe > 12 , dAdxe < 0 which implies that:
(
λn
∗
e1 − λn¯∗e1
)
(
λn
∗
e1 + 1
)(
λn¯
∗
e1 + 1
) <
(
λn
∗
e1 − λn¯∗e1
)
(
λn
∗
e1 + 1
)(
λn¯
∗
e1 + 1
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
xe=
1
2
=
(1− λn¯∗e2 )(
λn¯
∗
e2 + 1
) (29)
hence CTHR < 0. Therefore, in a duopoly when the distribution of citizens’ idiosyncratic preferences
is such that Condition A holds (and where citizens watch at most one media report), there will
never be an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium at x1e = 1 − x2e = 12 . Moreover, notice that
this is the unique Nash equilibrium. If the two media outlets were to choose ideological editors,
then each of them would clearly have an incentive to deviate by choosing a moderate one.
Let’s now analyze the case where Condition B holds. First of all, in order to ensure that there is
someone willing to watch media 1 the following condition must be satisfied
xI(n¯
∗
e1 , n
∗
e1 , n¯
∗
e2) < x˜e(x
1
e)
that is:
C < C¯ = 2δ
(
1− λn¯∗e1
)
(
λn¯
∗
e2 + 1
) (30)
where clearly C¯ > 0.46 Let’s now analyze the no-deviation condition for C < C¯. Consider (27)
and (28) and let CDuop = CDuop(xe1) be the highest opportunity cost such that for xe1 ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
the following condition holds (i.e., CDuop being the opportunity cost associated with the most
45Notice also that, as stated in section 2.2 the analysis focuses on symmetric distributions.
46Notice also that xI(n¯
∗
e1 , n
∗
e1
, n¯∗e2) < x˜e|xe= 12 if and only if C < Cˇ ≡ 2δ
(
1−λn¯
∗
e1
)
λ
n¯∗e2+1
λ
n∗e1 λn¯
∗
e2−1
λ
n∗e1 λn¯
∗
e1−1
where Cˇ > 0
since
∣∣n∗e1∣∣ > n¯∗e2 .
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profitable deviation from xe1 = 1/2):
47
F (max {xˆe1 ;xI(xe1)})− 12
F (x˜e1)− F ( x˜e|xe= 12 )
≥ 0 (31)
now denote CDev = min
{
C¯, CDuop
}
, then for C ∈ (0, CDev) media outlet 1 will have an incentive
to deviate by choosing an ideological editor.48 Hence, in such case there is no equilibrium where
both media outlets choose a moderate editor.49 Let’s now show that it can never exist an equi-
librium with xe1 = xe2 6= 12 . Suppose the two media outlets choose the same type of ideological
editors (e.g., xe1 = xe2 >
1
2). By doing so their demand would be
D1(xe1 = xe2) = D
2(xe1 = xe2) =
F (x˜e1)− F (xˆe1)
2
while if media outlet 2 chooses an editor with preferences xe2 = 1− xe1 its demand would be:
D2(xe2 = 1− xe1) = min
{
F (x˜e2);
1
2
}
− F (xˆe2)
where by symmetry xˆe2 = 1 − x˜e1 , which implies that F (xˆe2) = 1 − F (x˜e1) . Thus, a necessary
condition for media outlet 2 not be willing to deviate is 1 − F (xˆe1) > F (x˜e1) . However, since
xe1 >
1
2 , then x˜e1 > 1 − xˆe1 and given Condition B this condition cannot hold. An analogous
proof applies for xe1 = xe2 <
1
2 . Hence, for C ∈
(
0, CDev
)
the only possible Nash Equilibrium must
be such that xe1 = 1 − xe2 6= 1/2. Let’s show that this is indeed an equilibrium.50 Suppose that
xe1 = 1 − xe2 > 12 , then there are two possible cases. In the first one, ∀xe1 = 1 − xe2 ∈
(
1
2 , x
max
eR
)
it is always the case that:51
dF (max {xˆe1 ;xI(xe1)})
dxe1
∣∣∣∣
xe1=1−xe2
<
dF (x˜e1)
dxe1
∣∣∣∣
xe1=1−xe2
(32)
where for xe1 = 1 − xe2 , xI(xe1) is always 1/2. Hence in this case xe1 = 1 − xe2 = xmaxeR is a
Nash equilibrium. Indeed, by Lemma 1, x˜e1 is increasing in xe1 if and only if xe1 < x
max
eR
. Hence,
dF (x˜e1 )
dxe1
∣∣∣
xe1=1−xe2
> 0 if and only if xe1 < x
max
eR
. On the other hand, since by Lemma 1, for
xe1 > 1/2, xˆe1 is always increasing in xe1 and xI is increasing in xe1 when xe1 = 1 − xe2 (i.e., for
xI = 1/2). Thus given Condition B it is always the case that
dF(max{xˆe1 ;xI(xe1 )})
dxe1
∣∣∣∣
xe1=1−xe2
> 0.
Thus, none of the two media outlet would have an incentive to deviate from xe1 = 1− xe2 = xmaxeR
by choosing a more leftist or more rightist editor. In the second case, ∃xe1 ∈
(
1
2 , x
max
eR
)
such that
(32) is not verified. Hence, since by construction of CDev, for C < CDev:
dF (max {xˆe1 ;xI(xe1)})
dxe1
∣∣∣∣
xe1=1−xe2=1/2
<
dF (x˜e1)
dxe1
∣∣∣∣
xe1=1−xe2=1/2.
47Since f(x) is assumed to be symmetric with respect to 1/2, the mean and the median will always be at
1/2. Hence F (1/2) = 1/2.
48Clearly, if CDev < 0, firm 1 will never have an incentive to deviate. Indeed, as shown in the previous
case where (Condition A) holds, when F is a uniform c.d.f. CDev = CTHR < 0.
49CDev is always lower than Cmax since for C = Cmax only citizens with xe =
1
2 watch news reports and
thus firm 1 would never have an incentive to deviate.
50Obviously, for C ∈ (0, CDev) there are always two symmetric Nash Equilibria, i.e., xe1 = 1 − xe2 < 12
and xe1 = 1− xe2 > 12 .
51Symmetric conditions apply for media outlet 2.
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then it will always exist a xe1 ∈
(
1
2 , x
max
eR
)
such that:
dF (max {xˆe1 ;xI(xe1)})
dxe1
∣∣∣∣
xe1=1−xe2
=
dF (x˜e1)
dxe1
∣∣∣∣
xe1=1−xe2
(33)
that is, xe1 = 1− xe2 ∈
(
1
2 , x
max
eR
)
is a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we need to show that a lower C
is associated with a Nash equilibrium where the difference between the idiosyncratic preferences
of the editors chosen by each media outlet, i.e., |xe1 − xe2 | , is higher. First of all by Lemma 1, a
lower C corresponds to a higher xmaxeR and a lower x
min
eL
. Moreover, since as C decreases
dx˜e(n¯∗e1 ,n
∗
e1
)
dxe
increases, hence
dF (x˜e1 )
dxe1
∣∣∣
xe1=1−xe2
increases as well. Thus since the RHS of (33), the LHS must
increase as well, which, in turn implies that xe1 must be higher (similarly, xe2 will be lower). That
is, a lower C is associated with an equilibrium where the two media outlets choose less moderate
editors. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
We have to analyze the no-deviation condition with K media outlets. Let n¯∗e = −n∗e be the stopping
thresholds chosen by a moderate editor. The demand media outlet 1 faces if it chooses a moderate
editor as all the other media outlets is ∀j ∈ {2, 3, .....,K}:
DNDev(x1e) = D
NDev
(
xje
)
=
1
K
[
F ( x˜|xe= 12 )− F ( xˆ|xe= 12 )
]
=
2
K
[
F ( x˜|xe= 12 )− F (
1
2
)
]
Instead the demand that media outlet 1 faces if it deviates from such position is:
DDev(x1e) =
[
F ( x˜|x1e)− F (max {xˆe1 ;xI(xe1)})
]
Hence given a uniform distribution, media outlet 1 will prefer not to choose a moderate editor if
and only if:
K > K∗ =
2
[
x˜|xe= 12 −
1
2
]
x˜|x1e −max {xˆe1 ;xI(xe1)}
where we know from the proof of Proposition 3, that K∗ > 2. Moreover, the game satisfies the
properties of Theorem 4 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) for the existence of an equilibrium in
a product competition game. Hence, the K∗ media outlets game possesses a symmetric mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover it is always the case thatdK
∗
dC > 0 since xˆe1 is increasing in C
and dx˜e/dxe is decreasing in C. Q.E.D.
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